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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
MATTHEW DILLER: Good afternoon. My name is Matthew
Diller. I have the honor of being the Dean of Fordham University
School of Law. It is a pleasure to see you all here this afternoon.
Thank you for joining us for the Symposium of the Fordham
Journal of Corporate & Financial Law, which was founded twenty
years ago. This is an anniversary event for us. Let me just say that we
are so proud of the success the Journal has had and the impact that it has
had over the twenty years of its existence. In fact, it is remarkable that
the Journal is only twenty years old and is already the most cited
student-edited journal in banking and finance law.1 It shows how
quickly the Journal has had an impact. That is really what we aim to do
here. We aim to put forward considered, thoughtful, yet often
provocative ideas that meet a need in the marketplace and help us think
more clearly and more deeply about problems that we are facing in
moving forward through corporate leadership in our society.
Before I talk about today’s program, let me thank a few people. I
want to thank, in particular, Caitlin Fahey, the Journal’s Symposium
Editor, who put together today’s program. Thank you, Caitlin. I want to
thank two of our wonderful faculty members, Professor Caroline Gentile
and Professor Sean Griffith, for their leadership and their contributions
in guiding the Journal. I also want to thank Sean for his leadership of
the Corporate Law Center here at Fordham, which is one of our jewels
as well. The fact of the matter is that we really rock in the field of
business law. When you look at our course catalogue, we have an
amazing range of courses that our students really flock to. We also have
both the Corporate Law Center and the Journal as focal points for
activity, and as a way of getting our message out to the world. When
you add that all up, it is really remarkable. It is all supported by a superb
and extremely deep faculty.
I want to also thank our panelists for joining us, Richard Kim,
Fordham Law alumnus Eric Grossman, and our keynote speaker, Dan

1. According to the ranking system maintained by the Law Library at Washington
& Lee University School of Law. See Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking, 2007 –
2014, WASH. & LEE UNIV. SCH. LAW, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index2014.aspx?mainid=
554 [perma.cc/Z6GZ-LABF] (to replicate the search results, search “Subject: Banking
and finance;” then “Edit type: Student-edited;” and “Ranking Criteria: Case cites”).
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Gallagher. It is a pleasure to have you back at Fordham. There is one
more thank-you that I need to do by way of introduction, which is to
Professor Richard Squire, whom I have left for last, and whose work is
really the inspiration for today’s program. There has been a lot of talk
and discussion and back-and-forth on Dodd-Frank. There is a certain
book coming out in 2016 through the Columbia University Press that
you must read, Getting Ready for the Next Bailouts by Professor Richard
Squire,2 which is the inspiration for today’s program. Let me tell you a
little bit more about Richard. He has been a member of the Fordham
faculty since 2006. He teaches corporations and corporate
reorganization in bankruptcy. He has twice been elected Fordham Law
School’s Teacher of the Year in 2010 and 2011. His scholarly articles
have appeared in the Harvard Law Review,3 the Yale Law Journal,4 and
the Stanford Law Review,5 among other journals. That is really quite an
arsenal of accomplishments. So, we are all very glad to be here today.
I will now turn it over to you, Richard.

2. RICHARD SQUIRE, GETTING READY FOR THE NEXT BAILOUTS (forthcoming
2016).
3. Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1151 (2010).
4. Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L. J.
806 (2009).
5. Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77
(2006).
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PANEL
RICHARD SQUIRE: Thank you very much for that introduction,
Dean Diller.
Our program today consists of two main events. First, we are going
to have this panel discussion. Each of the panelists is going to speak for
about fifteen to twenty minutes on the subject of the conference. The
title of the conference is Are We Ready for the Next Financial Crisis?
We will have time to take about thirty-five minutes of questions from
you all. We are looking forward to those questions. We will have a
break for about fifteen minutes, and then we will have a very special
second half of the event, which is the keynote address from former
Commissioner Gallagher. Since I am the host of the panel, it is my
responsibility to get the conversation going by speaking first. But before
I give my comments, I would like to introduce my co-panelists. We are
very lucky to have both of these gentlemen here.
Eric F. Grossman is the Chief Legal Officer at Morgan Stanley, a
position he has held since 2012. He previously was Morgan Stanley’s
head of litigation and the General Counsel of the Americas. Before he
joined Morgan Stanley in January of 2006, he was a partner in the
litigation department of Davis Polk & Wardwell, where he started
working in 1994. He became a partner there in 2001. He graduated from
Hamilton College in 1988, and—the most distinguished accomplishment
on his résumé—he graduated from the Fordham Law School with a
degree magna cum laude in 1993, where he was a member of the Order
of the Coif and part of the Fordham Law Review. He also clerked for the
Honorable Richard J. Cardamone for U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit after leaving Fordham. We are very excited to have you
here, Mr. Grossman.
After Mr. Grossman speaks, Richard Kim will speak. Mr. Kim is a
partner at the New York law firm of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.
He specializes in representing financial institutions in a broad range of
regulatory matters, including in connection with mergers and
acquisitions, enforcement actions, compliance, and related matters. He
was previously an attorney with the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System—the Federal Reserve is going to play prominently in
my comments—where he worked on a wide range of bank supervisory
matters. He was also Assistant General Counsel with NationsBank
Corporation. He graduated from Stanford in 1983, and his law degree is
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from Columbia in 1986. He is also a member of the Board of Directors
of the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund.
I would like to thank both of my co-panelists for joining me today.
I am speaking first, and I feel like I should start by giving you what I
think is the answer to the question: Are we ready for the next financial
crisis? My answer is going to be no, I do not think we are. In a certain,
important way, I think we are less ready than we were in 2007 and 2008
during the last crisis. I am going to tell you about why I think that is and
maybe what we need to do about it in the future.
I will discuss just a little bit of information to refresh our memories,
because it has been almost ten years. Back in 2006, housing prices did
something that they are not supposed to do ever—they fell. They started
falling in 2006 and continued falling in 2007.6 People started defaulting
on their mortgages at rates that were unprecedented.7 This created risk
for banks because banks and other financial institutions held much of
either the original loans or the repackaged loans in mortgage-backed
securities and other instruments. So, in 2007, financial institutions
started having difficulty in terms of their liquidity.8 They were running
short on cash. Depositors were taking their money away. Other shortterm creditors were not rolling over the debt. So, we had a financial
crisis—or at least a liquidity crisis initially—in the making.
In December 2007, the Federal Reserve created the first of several
emergency liquidity mechanisms to provide cash to the financial sector
pursuant to its power to do so as the lender of last resort as the central
bank in the United States. The general public started paying attention. I
started paying attention—I count myself as a member of the general
public, certainly at this point. In March 2008, Bear Stearns, the big
investment bank, looked like it was going to file for bankruptcy.9
Nobody thought this could happen. The federal government, in the first
of what I think of as the “notorious bailouts,” backed an acquisition and
6. See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
31-32 (5th ed. 2013).
7. See id.
8. For a discussion of these liquidity problems, see generally Markus K.
Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008, 23 J. ECON.
PERSP., no. 1, 2009, http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.23.1.77 [http://per
ma.cc/CU4N-NHGN].
9. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT:
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 280-91 (2011).
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put some taxpayer money at risk so that Bear Stearns would not file for
bankruptcy. Instead, it would be acquired by J.P. Morgan.10 Things
reached a boiling point, both politically and financially, in September
2008. Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.11 Simultaneously, the most
notorious of all the bailouts occurred. You may remember that a large
amount of money was made available, initially by the Federal Reserve,
and that would eventually be worth $180 billion, to the international
insurance company, AIG, that got involved in mortgage assets by
writing certain derivatives that ensured the performance of certain
mortgage-backed securities.12
There was outrage at this point. This was seen as something that
was necessary, but it was a necessary evil. AIG did not help matters for
itself. You might remember, in early 2009, AIG announced that it was
going to pay some bonuses to the people who were in the same
department—it was actually in London—that had been selling these
credit default swaps that had gotten in trouble.13 There was this outrage
that taxpayer money was going to be used to pay expensive bonuses to
rich bankers. President Obama actually directed Timothy Geithner, the
Treasury Secretary, to pursue every legal avenue possible to block these
bonuses and to make the American taxpayers whole.14
People were outraged across the political spectrum at what was
happening. I was among the people who were outraged. Occupy Wall
Street, that movement of ongoing outrage, would be an outgrowth of all
of this. I think there were two main reasons for the outrage. One had to
10. See id. J.P. Morgan initially offered to buy Bear Stearns for $2 per share, but
later increased the offer to $10 per share. See id. at 290; Andrew Ross Sorkin,
JPMorgan Raises Bid for Bear Stearns to $10 a Share, N.Y. TIMES (March 24, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/24/business/24deal-web.html [http://perma.cc/EYD875CD].
11. Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG
Seeks Cash, WALL. ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2008, 6:52 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12
2145492097035549 [http://perma.cc/BJP6-UPWQ].
12. See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 943 (2009).
13. Edmund L. Andrews & Peter Baker, A.I.G. Planning Huge Bonuses After $170
Billion Bailout, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/15/busi
ness/15AIG.html [http://perma.cc/6BA4-97CY].
14. Obama’s Statement on A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES: THE CAUCUS (Mar. 16, 2009, 12:45
PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/16/obamas-statement-on-aig/ [http://
perma.cc/KV93-8J75].
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do with a sense of an injustice being done: that money was being
transferred from the average American, or at least the average American
taxpayer, to very wealthy Wall Street bankers. So, this seemingly
regressive wealth transfer was occurring. The other had to do with
whether you are someone who generally believes in free markets—and I
put myself in that category—then you thought that something else
perverse was happening, which was that the government was getting
involved in the economy, and that moral hazard was being created. We
were taking losses and transferring the burden of them from the people
who were responsible to people who were not responsible, to innocent
people, to the taxpayers. If you have that kind of transfer of loss, then it
just encourages more irresponsible behavior.
We had the main political response, but we also had the main
regulatory and statutory response, which was the Dodd-Frank Act
enacted in 2010.15 There is no doubt about it that this was an “antibailout” bill. It actually says in the preface that the promise was to end
“too big to fail” and “to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts.”16 The statute imposes a slew of new regulations on banks and
financial institutions. They are supposed to make these institutions more
sound and less risky. There are also many regulations that were political
priorities for Congress at the time, but were not related to the financial
crisis. I am not going to address those now. It is a very large bill and it
tries to do many things.
One of the things that it does as part of its anti-bailout agenda is to
clip the wings of the Federal Reserve.17 The Federal Reserve has an
emergency lending power as part of its lender-of-last-resort function, but
the statute amended the Federal Reserve’s power, and it said that in the
future the Federal Reserve would no longer be able to lend to just one
particular financial institution.18 What the Federal Reserve would have
to do instead is to lend based on broad-based eligibility criteria
established beforehand.19 This is the “anti-AIG” bailout provision. There
is no doubt that Congress had it in mind that we never want that to
happen again; we never want a one-off type of bailout where the Federal
15. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.
(2012)).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 1101, 124 Stat. at 2113-15.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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Reserve uses its statutory power to bail out one particular institution.
President Obama, when he signed the bill, said “the American people
will never again be asked to foot the bill for Wall Street’s mistakes.”20
That is about where we were in 2010. We had this narrative that
Wall Street had fleeced Main Street, and therefore, we had a statute that
would make sure that did not happen again. But, we need to update the
narrative. We need to look at what happened in the subsequent years. A
funny thing happened on the way to the fleecing of the American
taxpayer, which is that Wall Street paid all of the money back, with
interest. I will give you some specific examples of this. Some of you
may know this, and some of you may be surprised by this. This certainly
was not emphasized nearly as much in the press as the original bailouts
were.
Let me start with the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”).
TARP was the bailout fund that was authorized by Congress in October
2008.21 At this point, back in October 2008, there was so much flak
being received by the Federal Reserve for its liquidity measures that it
felt that it simply could not go on without some kind of political cover.
It went to Congress and said, “We want you to authorize money to be
given,” and Congress did that. TARP was originally authorized for $700
billion.22 Not all of that was ever disbursed. $313 billion was disbursed
to the financial sector.23 The financial sector paid back $321 billion. It is
not a great return on your investment, but when you are expecting to
lose hundreds of billions of dollars, and it turns out that the taxpayer
actually makes money, then it turns out to be a successful program.
TARP is not the biggest story in terms of the bailouts of the time,
but it was the most famous. The Federal Reserve created several other
liquidity mechanisms. I will mention one: the Term Auction Facility

20. Barack Obama, President, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall
-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act [http://perma.cc/NM8Y-HD3F].
21. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, tit. I, 122
Stat. 3765, 3767-800.
22. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act § 115.
23. Report on the Troubled Asset Relief Program−March 2015, Cong. Budgeting
Office, at 3 (2015), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/re
ports/50034-TARP.pdf [http://perma.cc/88UQ-WQTW].
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(“TAF”).24 There is a good chance you have not heard of this or do not
know much about it. From December 2007 to March 2010, the Federal
Reserve made liquidity loans to banks. The largest amount outstanding
was $493 billion at one point, so this was actually bigger than TARP.25
That was all repaid in full with interest.
In addition, the Treasury guaranteed for one year all investors in
money market mutual funds.26 This was after one money market mutual
fund, Reserve Primary Fund, broke the buck.27 This means that it
became slightly insolvent. There was then a general run by investors in
other money market mutual funds. To put an end to this, the Treasury
guaranteed the investments for a year. The number of claims made to
the Treasury on these guarantees for that one year was zero. No claims
were made.28 We never had to pay out—by “we,” I mean the taxpayer—
on these guarantees. In fact, we made money because $1.2 billion was
charged in fees to the funds that received the guarantees.29
So far, so good, in terms of these bailouts. They are not fleecing the
taxpayer. Now, let us go to the most notorious bailout, AIG. AIG was
given $182 billion at various points.30 In the end, the government
received that amount in full, plus an additional profit of $23 billion.31
This was a very high rate of return on a government-based loan
24. For more information about the TAF, see Term Auction Facility, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/taf.
htm [http://perma.cc/G8YN-ZCUL] (last updated Nov. 24, 2015).
25. See Bradley Keoun, Fed’s $1.2 Trillion Loan Lifelines Dwarfed TARP:
Glossary, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Aug. 21, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2011-08-21/fed-s-1-2-trillion-liquidity-lifelines-dwarfed-tarp-glossary
[http://perma.cc/L646-TTME].
26. See Press Center: Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee Program for
Money Market Funds, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp1161.aspx [http://perma.cc/BET7-Y2PP].
27. See Diya Gullapalli, Shefali Anand & Daisy Maxey, Money Fund, Hurt by
Debt Tied to Lehman, Breaks the Buck, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 17, 2008, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122160102128644897 [http://perma.cc/J663-UCGQ].
28. See Press Center: Treasury Announces Expiration of Guarantee Program for
Money Market Funds, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Sept. 18, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/
press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg293.aspx [http://perma.cc/SX5P-PWBD].
29. See id.
30. See Press Center: Treasury Sells Final Shares of AIG Common Stock, Positive
Return on Overall AIG Commitment Reaches $22.7 billion, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Dec.
11, 2012), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1796.aspx [http:
//perma.cc/7GF3-P67U].
31. See id.
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investment that was ultimately in one financial institution. There is a
certain irony here. AIG was the most notorious of the bailouts, and yet it
was the most successful according to a set of criteria set out by Walter
Bagehot, an English economist in the nineteenth century who wrote
about the proper role of a central bank in a liquidity crisis.32 He wrote
that in a financial crisis, the central bank provides a valuable service by
lending freely to solvent financial institutions at penalty rates against
good collateral. Penalty rates mean a high rate of interest, which is
certainly what AIG paid.
Why is that a good idea? Well, that means that we do not have
moral hazard. The private investors, the shareholders who are borrowing
the money, are the ones that are bearing the costs. The taxpayer does not
bear the cost, and so we do not have moral hazard. AIG’s shareholders
paid through the nose for that bailout money, so much so that one of
them sued the federal government. That shareholder was Hank
Greenberg, the former CEO of AIG. He was pushed out by Eliot Spitzer
before any of this happened. He sued the federal government claiming
that the bailout money was so expensive that it amounted to a taking of
private property for public use without compensation, and thus was a
Fifth Amendment violation.33 Regardless of what we think of the
constitutional argument, it certainly shows that this was not free money
being given away.
What we have in Dodd-Frank, once we update the story, and once
we look at the fact that the bailout money was all paid back with
interest—with an exception that I am going to talk about in a moment—
we see that Dodd-Frank reflects a misdiagnosis. Wall Street, or the
financial sector generally, was not insolvent in 2007 or 2008. A few
firms were slightly insolvent and what we had was a liquidity problem.
This was not a surprise. Financial institutions often get into liquidity
difficulties. Their job is to take short-term liquid loans, deposits, and so
on, and invest them in illiquid assets, which are mainly but not
exclusively mortgage-based assets. Sometimes when there is a drop in
the value of those assets, which is what we had, there is a concern in the
market that some of these financial institutions may be insolvent and
will not repay either in full or on time, so investors and depositors
32. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET
(1873).
33. See Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 121 Fed. Cl. 428, 431 (2015).
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rationally want to pull their money out. However, they do not know
which ones are insolvent, so they pull their money out of all of them.
There is a lack of transparency about who is going to fail, who may be
in trouble, and who is not. As a result, the financial sector as a whole no
longer can tap private sources of cash. This is where the lender of last
resort, serving a valuable function, steps in. You do not have to be
someone on the left wing politically to believe that the lender of last
resort is a good idea. These are not Keynesian stimulus packages, which
are controversial. Bagehot was a very conservative economist. This is a
valuable public service, especially when the government has a fiat
currency. It can provide liquidity more cheaply than others.
By the way, we should not have been surprised that most firms in
the financial sector never became insolvent. A couple of numbers put
this in perspective. At the end of 2006, there were $1.3 trillion of
subprime mortgages outstanding. It sounds like a lot, but if we look at
that same point and add up the equity value—not the value of the assets,
but the shareholder equity—of all the financial institutions plus Wall
Street institutions, it exceeded $1.3 trillion. Even if those subprime
mortgages had turned out to be worth zero, it would not have rendered
the whole financial sector insolvent. Actually, the losses, which were
much greater than anybody expected, were only a fraction of that $1.3
trillion—about a fifth.
There was no doubt that we were not going to be facing widespread
insolvency. What we had was widespread illiquidity. The Federal
Reserve did what it was supposed to do. It was flexible at this period. It
was nimble in its responses. The bailouts overall did a pretty good job.
Now, there is an exception here. I do not want to say the bailouts were
perfect. I am going to criticize TARP in particular. Remember, this is
where Congress got into the act, and then the Treasury Department got
into the act and made two mistakes. I keep saying the money was paid
back. It was paid back if we are talking about financial institutions.
The Secretary of the Treasury Department also authorized loans for
GM and Chrysler.34 You have probably heard of them. They are not
banks; they are manufacturers of automobiles. They do not face liquidity
crises; they face solvency problems. Eighty billion dollars was given to
34. Financial Stability: Auto Industry, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (last updated
Dec. 22, 2014), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/
automotive-programs/Pages/overview.aspx [http://perma.cc/MHU5-M289].
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Detroit, and Detroit did not give anywhere close to that back. Most of
the losses on TARP, about $15 billion, are from the bailouts to the
automakers.35
You may think that it was a good idea for other reasons, maybe for
political reasons or for general economic stimulus, but it certainly does
not fit the textbook of the lender-of-last-resort function of the central
bank. My view is that it had a political motivation. In addition, TARP
created more risk for the taxpayer because, unlike the Federal Reserve,
Congress did not lend money precisely. What Congress did was give
investments in exchange for preferred stock, which put the taxpayer
lower down in the pecking order in case the entity failed. It did not end
up failing, but if it had, there would have been greater losses for the
taxpayer, and therefore, more risk. Certain mistakes are made when this
function is transferred from the central bank to the political branches.
Here, it transferred from the Federal Reserve to Congress, and then to
the Treasury Department and the executive branch.
Are we going to have another crisis? Every major banking crisis in
developed economies since 1945 has followed a drop in housing prices.
This is well established now. If you want to read the book on this, it is
This Time Is Different by economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth
Rogoff.36 This is always and everywhere, since 1945, in Europe, Japan,
and the United States. After a housing crisis, prices fall and then we
have a banking crisis. If we were really worried about banking crises,
the best response would have been to change our housing policy. For
reasons that I do not completely understand, there is a view that you are
simply an irresponsible person, and that you are not really grown up and
mature, if you do not own your house. I am a renter, but for some
reason, the federal government thinks that I am irresponsible. We have a
policy in the United States in which we subsidize through the tax code,
and through other government agencies, programs that are designed to
put people into houses that they own through mortgages, even if their
credit would not enable them to get a loan otherwise.37 As long as we
35. Brent Snavely, Final Tally: Taxpayers Auto Bailout Loss $9.3B, USA TODAY
(Dec. 30, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2014/12/30/auto
-bailout-tarp-gm-chrysler/21061251/ [http://perma.cc/3BNT-96FA].
36. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009).
37. James Surowiecki, The Mortgage Mistake, NEW YORKER (Jan. 12, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/12/mortgage-mistake [http://perma.cc/9
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have that subsidy for the housing market, we are going to have a risk of
a financial crisis.
Given that, are we in a better position than we were before? I say
no. The reason is that Dodd-Frank, for one, clipped the wings of the
Federal Reserve to provide this lender-of-last-resort function and to
provide liquidity. I think when a crisis happens again, it is going to have
to go to Congress for authorization for more money earlier than it even
did in 2008. This introduces a political variable, which can create
uncertainty and other associated risks. The problem here is not just in
terms of regulatory awareness. There is, I think, a mentality, and there is
a political problem as well. Bailouts have a really bad name. It is like the
Rodney Dangerfield of economic policy. I think the government actually
did a great job, and this is coming from someone who is generally a
free-market type of person. In particular, the Federal Reserve did a very
good job, but the view is that they are so bad that now it is going to be
even more politically damaging to try to do anything like that again.
Right now, Congress—which is mainly Republican—is proposing
legislation that would further roll back the ability of the Federal
Reserve, and secondarily, the Treasury, to provide liquidity to struggling
financial institutions in a crisis.38 I think bailouts have an undeserved
bad name. Properly structured, they work well.
What do I think academics like me should do? I think to better
prepare us for the next crisis, it is the job of academics and other
commentators to revisit the facts, update impressions, and try to
acquaint politicians, the press, and the general public with the real
lessons of the last crisis. And that gives me a perfect opportunity to plug
my book. In my book, which will be coming out next year, I will try to
do exactly that.39 I have given you a summary of my arguments here.
Thank you for your attention. I will now turn it over to Mr.
Grossman.
ERIC GROSSMAN: I will try not to repeat what Richard said. I
think there is probably a fair bit of overlap for all of us. I sent Richard a
note a couple of weeks ago that said, “What do you want me to talk
about?” He said, “Well, the question for the day is, are we better able to
prevent and weather another financial crisis?”

FBV-MPDL].
38. See Bailout Prevention Act of 2015, S. 1320, 114th Cong. (2015).
39. SQUIRE, supra note 2.

246

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXI

Hopefully, history informs in terms of where we are right now and
the tools that are available. In that sense, history is quite helpful. As
Richard points out, there is a fair bit of misunderstanding. There were
lost opportunities all along the way for the narrative to be more fairly
told. The one that resonates the most for me was the Financial Crisis
Inquiry Commission (“FCIC”).40 After 9/11, there was the 9/11
Commission, which actually brought together the greatest and best
minds to look at what had happened, at the failures of government, of
intelligence, and of the business community, and to make concrete and
specific recommendations.41 You may agree or disagree with those, but
it was done purely in the interests of the country.
The stated goal of the FCIC was to do the same, but it basically
turned into a political circus. It was handed over to plaintiffs’ lawyers,
who created a narrative that sort of suited them, which was that the
banks were solely responsible. The FCIC contributed to the
demonization of the banks and financial services. I am not here to argue
with the outrage because I live here in New York and I lived through it.
I think, to some extent, clearly the outrage, coupled with the
misunderstanding, has left us in a difficult spot on the “weather” side.
On the prevention side, an extraordinary amount has been done.
While Richard was talking, I wrote down that I think a financial crisis is
less likely, but that we are less ready. Why is it less likely?
Fundamentally, if you look at it from a banker’s perspective, which I
lived through, and if you pull together the strands from all of the various
episodes, whether it is the Bear Stearns episode, the Lehman Brothers
episode, the Morgan Stanley episode, or the Bank of America episode, it
really comes down to confidence. Runs on banks go back to the
beginning of time because the banking system is fundamentally built on
confidence. People take their money, they bring it to a bank, and they
leave it there expecting it to be there when they come back. You have to
trust that your life savings, your inheritance, and the product of your
labors are going to be there when you come back. And then what do
banks do? Of course, banks then borrow themselves and enhance the
size of their balance sheet, and they lend and provide capital so that the
economy grows. This is all done with the implicit understanding that
40.
41.

FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 9.
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON
THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (2002).
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when you come back asking for your money, you will get it back. So,
confidence is key.
As one thinks about whether the public should be more confident in
the banking sector, the answer is unequivocally yes, in my mind,
provided that people think rationally. I will talk a little bit about
irrationality in a minute, and, of course, rationality to irrationality is
across a continuum. But from a rational perspective, banks are much
safer than they were before the crisis. If any blame can be laid at the feet
of the banks prior to the crisis, it is that the things that we do now should
have been done before, and certainly done more thoughtfully. We have
far more capital now. Banks in the United States, and globally,
unequivocally have way more capital than we ever had before. We carry
way more liquidity. If you think about a banking crisis as fundamentally
being a concern that your cash, when you come back for it, would not be
there, we carry way more liquidity than we did before. And, our balance
sheets are far less levered. If you take our capital and then think about
the size of our balance sheet, the ratios are all constrained.
Why do we do all these things? We started to do all of these things
after the crisis. We saw what happened and we learned these lessons
ourselves. On top of that, the Federal Reserve, which came within a
hair’s breadth in Dodd-Frank of losing its supervisory authority over
United States banks, retained that authority and has constructed a
regulatory framework with two pillars: Comprehensive Capital Analysis
and Review (“CCAR”) and Comprehensive Liquidity Assessment and
Review (“CLAR”).42 Every bank holding company in the United States
is subject to annual tests by the Federal Reserve Bank to ensure that
under the absolute worst, draconian scenario that you could imagine—
the Great Recession, the Great Depression, a singular idiosyncratic loss,
all of those things coming at one time—you can still deliver capital back
to your shareholders in the form of either stock repurchases or
dividends. The last time around every bank in the country passed
CCAR.
If you want a perspective not dissimilar to the one that Richard and
I have about what has happened here, Dick Bove would tell you that, as
an investor, banks are in fact the safest place to put your money these

42. Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Speech at
the Clearing House 2014 Annual Conference (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.federalreserv
e.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20141120a%20.htm [http://perma.cc/RL54-SY9N].
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days43 because there is no industry anywhere on the planet that is subject
to these kinds of tests that go to their fundamental capital structure. We
at Morgan Stanley cannot deliver a dividend to our shareholders without
the approval of the Federal Reserve. We cannot buy stock back without
the approval of the Federal Reserve. We cannot make a significant
acquisition without the approval of the Federal Reserve. We do that
every year. Our balance sheet, of course, is constrained by the
supplemental leverage ratio, which is built into the CCAR process.
I could go on and on about the various things banks are now subject
to, and I am not complaining about these things. What I am here to tell
you is that, in terms of the financial sector, it is drastically different.
From a rational perspective, banks are safer, and in that sense, I am not a
Dodd-Frank “hater.” There are aspects of it that I think are misguided,
but I think that is quite clear that a crisis is less likely to occur because
banks are better situated.
Now, there is always a place for irrational behavior. I just want to
touch on that. It is fair to say that in the environment we live in today, it
is much more likely. With the Internet, hedge funds and investors who
generally have an incentive to put downward pressure on a stock can do
so much more easily than they could before. We at Morgan Stanley, just
a couple of years ago, saw about a 10% decline in our stock based on an
anonymous report that came out on the Internet suggesting that we were
disproportionately exposed to Greece during the Greek crisis, which was
not true.44 We rushed out a disclosure in which we identified all of our
European country periphery exposure so that we could disabuse the
world of that.45 However, within the time period that it took us to correct
that, our stock was down 10%. And what is stock price? Actually, it has
no bearing on capital, liquidity, or anything other than it is the easiest
proxy for whether or not a bank is doing well. So there is a place for
irrationality; if they start coming after you, and if it is all built on
confidence, then there is really no defense to that.
43. See Dan Weil, Richard Bove: Banks Are ‘Healthiest They’ve Been Since
Depression’, NEWSMAX (Jan. 7, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.newsmax.com/Finance/Str
eetTalk/Bove-banks-healthiest-depression/2014/01/07/id/545735/ [http://perma.cc/4U2
9-AAX8].
44. Paul R. La Monica, Is Morgan Stanley the Next Lehman?, CNN (Oct. 3, 2011,
1:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2011/10/03/markets/thebuzz/ [http://perma.cc/Z4DFGNC6].
45. MORGAN STANLEY, 3Q 2011 FINANCIAL SUPPLEMENT 13 (2011).
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To get back to my basic thesis, from a rational perspective, we are
far more able to prevent a financial crisis. As to whether or not we are in
a better position to weather a financial crisis, I largely agree with
everything that Richard said. There has been a great distortion of what
the lender-of-last-resort purpose is and what a bailout is. I agree the term
“helping hand” would have been better. “Bailout,” of course, suggests
that the role being played is not a proper one.
Take a bigger bank than the bank that I work at. For example, let us
consider J.P. Morgan—a big, giant bank. If J.P. Morgan gets in trouble,
with all of the depositor money that is there—there is a Chase on every
corner—there is no entity out there large enough, other than the United
States Government, that can actually prevent them from toppling over.
We need that. That is the foundational element of an economy. DoddFrank, in the interest of an overheated political environment, robbed the
Federal Reserve of those powers to act. Both of the gentlemen to my
right and left here understand the provisions and the changes to those far
better than I do, but I can tell you that as a citizen that scares me. It is
not out of self-interest. I work at a bank every day. People in the wake
of the crisis formed views about bankers. There was this very clear
sense that Main Street bailed out Wall Street. My view is that the
government actually bailed out Main Street. We have developed this
sort of fundamental disconnect in the United States of the role and the
criticality of financial services to our success as a country and the
success of our economy.
I am not going to sing our praises at Morgan Stanley, but we have a
very basic strategy. We raise, manage, and distribute capital for
individuals, sovereigns, corporations, and institutions. That is what we
do, and that is what we view as our role fundamentally. A company, or
great idea, needs to raise money in order to develop that great idea. They
come to us and that is what we do. The people at Facebook develop a
brilliant idea. They devote their lives to it. They want to become a
public company. They come to Morgan Stanley.46 In conjunction with
the other banks, we underwrite their public offering to allow that
company to prosper and grow. There are no greater and more developed
capital markets than here in the United States.
46. See Serena Saitto, Cristina Alesci & Lee Spears, Facebook Underwriters to
Split $176 Million in IPO Fees, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (May 18, 2012, 6:09 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-18/facebook-underwriters-to-splitabout-176-million-in-ipo-fees [http://perma.cc/BNY6-PKJM].
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It is all fundamentally founded on the notion that, at the end of the
day, when you go to a bank and put your money in the bank, it will be
there when you come back. If you worry about that, you will just leave
your money under your mattress at home, where it does no good for the
rest of society and where it is at much greater risk.
I worry about that distortion. If you think fundamentally about
Dodd-Frank, it put the tools, not entirely, but more in the hands of
Congress to act. I remember watching in my office as the first TARP
votes rolled in, and the no votes overwhelmed, I was thinking that it was
the end. I went to a cash machine and took out some cash that day
because I thought that this was the end. Obviously, none of us want to
see that happen. I will touch on some of the other things that came out of
Dodd-Frank, very briefly. Then, I will turn it over to the other Richard.
Included within Dodd-Frank were a number of ancillary provisions
that I believe were intended to prevent excessive risk taking or excessive
risk within financial institutions. The most prominent of those is the
Volcker Rule.47 I suspect if I asked everyone here what the Volcker Rule
was, almost all of you would say it prohibits prop trading at banks. That
is the way that Mr. Volcker himself would refer to it, but, in fact, the
Volcker Rule prohibits non-prohibited proprietary trading because what
goes on at banks all the time is that we put our capital at risk every day
in making markets and in hedging our own risks. The citizen and the
corporation actually want banks playing this fundamental marketmaking role.
In a crisis situation, one can take Morgan Stanley as an example.
Richard, to my right, has a basket of securities that he needs to sell. He
has to sell those in a crisis because he has to pay his employees or
maybe he has an acquisition that he wants to do. He has a basket of
securities that he wants to sell and it is critical for him to sell. Banks,
before the Volcker Rule, would buy that basket of securities. They
would give him a price and they would buy it, even if they had no idea
necessarily what they were going to do with it. Now, under the Volcker
Rule, when the banks buy Richard’s basket of odd securities that do not
trade readily on a market, the banks actually cannot buy those unless
they reasonably expect that Richard, on my left, or some other Richard
47. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620-31 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §
1851 (2012)).
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out there is going to buy them. The banks have to prove to five different
regulators that they reasonably expected Richard, on my left, or
someone else to buy those securities. This puts aside all of the liquidity
constraints, punitive capital charges, and the other things that have
emerged from the credit crisis. In a crisis, am I going to do that? I do not
know. So just when the country would want the major banks to jump in
and provide liquidity, we are going to be less likely to do it, it is going to
be harder for us to do it, and we are actually going to create risk for
ourselves.
What has that done? That has pushed risk into places that are far
less regulated. At Morgan Stanley, we have 175 bank examiners who
come to work at Morgan Stanley every day. They have a card, they log
in, we have a whole floor for them, and we pay for them. We are safe.
We are less sound, but we are plenty safe. Again, I worry about the
“weather” piece. In terms of prevention, I think the industry itself, with
the Federal Reserve clearly leading the way, has unquestionably created
a much safer banking system in terms of confidence. But I think if we
find ourselves in a storm, we have far fewer umbrellas and raincoats.
RICHARD KIM: I think you are going to find that we are more or
less in agreement. To go to the question that Professor Squire posed, are
we ready for the next financial crisis? I would say, almost by definition,
you do not see a financial crisis coming. So, I would say no, but I do
think that all of the regulatory reforms that we have talked about should
make the next financial crisis less severe.
As for whether we are now better positioned to handle the next
financial crisis than we were in 2008, I think that is really the harder
question. I would say, on balance, we are probably marginally better
positioned, but I do not think that it is because of Dodd-Frank. I think
Dodd-Frank has some redeeming provisions, but so much of it has just
been an enormous, unnecessary burden on the banking industry. It has
hurt the city. It has hurt the economy.
I am going to cover three topics: 1) how the financial regulatory
system has evolved since 2008, 2) an overview of the regulatory
environment today, and 3) whether today’s regulators are better able to
handle the next financial crisis than the regulators were in 2008.
If we go to the first topic, what has happened since 2008? There has
really been a seismic change in the financial regulatory system. I think
Eric gave a good summary of all the changes that have happened. Many
point to Dodd-Frank as a reason for this. In my view, the real effective
changes that mattered occurred independently of Dodd-Frank.
Immediately following the financial crisis in 2008, there was a profound
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and lasting change in the perspective of the financial regulators. As early
as 2009, a year before Dodd-Frank was enacted, the bank regulators
were already out there toughening standards. They significantly raised
the bar for United States banks. Much of this was done with four tools,
and none of these were born out of Dodd-Frank. They were all done
under statutory authority that existed before then.
First, immediately after the crisis, a large number of banks were
downgraded by the regulators. You may know that the bank regulators
rate banks and bank holding companies. There is a scale between one
and five, with one being the best and five being the worst.48 After the
crisis, virtually no bank received a one. Before the crisis, it was not
unusual for a well-run bank to have a one rating. That does not really
exist anymore, so the curve has changed. They do not give out A’s
anymore. A rating of two is satisfactory. Once you get to a three, you
have a problem. A rating of three essentially puts a bank in the penalty
box. You are unable to acquire. You are unable to branch. You have
caps on your ability to pay dividends. When you are downgraded to a
four, you are deemed to be a troubled institution. That is when the
problems really start. Formal, public enforcement actions are instituted
by the regulators. You are subject to heightened oversight and the
number of regulators at your bank dramatically increases. They place
restrictions on your ability to hire new management and directors. They
want the approval for any senior manager that you hire. If you want to
change a position in the senior ranks, you have to get their approval to
do that. If people leave, you cannot pay them the severance, even if they
are doing it with a contract, without regulatory approval, which is very
hard to get. If you are rated a five, you are deemed to be at probable risk
of failure. I think if you look at the banks rated at five, very few of them
actually come back from that. The ratings that are assigned to a bank are
completely discretionary. They are strictly confidential and the banks
are prohibited by law from disclosing them.49 They are not subject to
judicial review. So, they are really sort of the perfect supervisory tool.
You immediately saw banks being downgraded, putting the pressure on
them.

48. The scale refers to the CAMELS rating system. For a more in depth discussion
of the scale, see CARNELL ET AL., supra note 6, at 434-40.
49. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 261.2(c)(1), 261.20(g), 261.22(e) (2015).
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Second, there was an absolute battery of enforcement actions, the
number and severity of which was without precedent. I think everyone
would see, just by picking up a paper every other day, some massive
enforcement action directed at a bank. They ranged from increasing
capital to strengthening anti-money launder compliance, consumer
compliance, or risk management. There were loads and loads of them,
with civil money penalties that were exponentially higher than what was
required pre-crisis.
The third tool is corporate governance. The regulators have been
exerting an enormous amount of pressure on the boards of directors of
banks to strengthen capital, liquidity, risk management, compliance, and
internal audit. They did not used to do that. Effectively, they have used
the pressure on boards in a very assertive way, and I think in a very
effective way. I think the way it came about was, following the crisis, in
the regulators’ view, the industry then had what they would call an
ethical crisis. You had scandals ranging from mortgage servicing to
LIBOR, foreign exchange, and all the different things you see in the
papers. I think at the time, the regulators realized that you cannot predict
where the next scandal is going to occur. So, one way to get ahead of
this is to put pressure on the boards and make them do it.
Over the past couple of years, it is a very common complaint from
my clients that the Fed is putting dramatically increased pressure on
their boards of directors. The Fed is out there positing that directors
have a fiduciary duty not just to the shareholders, but to the regulators,
which suggests causes of action to plaintiffs’ lawyers. We all know the
consequences there. They are widely criticizing bank boards for
providing insufficient challenges to management. They are interviewing
independent board members and independent chairmen to see whether
or not they really have a strong grasp of the issues at hand by conducting
ad hoc phone calls and quizzing them on things.
Fourth, Eric mentioned CCAR. I think CCAR is probably the most
powerful tool the Fed has these days. Any large bank, $50 billion or
more in assets, is subject to this annual stress test.50 Each year you have
to file a capital plan, proposing how much, in the way of dividends, you
plan to pay out over the following nine quarters. If you plan to make
material acquisitions, you note that there as well. You do not have to say
who you are going to acquire, but you have to give them a sense of the
amount and the impact on capital. Then you have to submit your
50.

See 12 C.F.R. pt. 46.
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stressed numbers. You actually have to show how your balance sheet
will fare in a hypothetically adverse and severely adverse scenario that
the Fed gives you. The Fed gives you the assumptions, and they are
everywhere, such as stock market crashes or skyrocketing
unemployment. We have had a euro collapse, and we have had to model
for global pandemics. These are very detailed submissions. CCAR
submissions can run up to 10,000 pages.
The Fed can object to a capital plan. First, on quantitative grounds,
they can say, at the end of the day, “Under these hypothetical scenarios,
you do not have enough capital, so we object,” which means that you
cannot do the acquisitions, and you cannot pay the dividends. They can
object on what they call qualitative grounds, which really is any other
reason. They can also object if they do not like the strength of your
internal controls or if they do not like the strength of capital risk
management. Unlike the bank ratings I previously discussed, whether
you pass CCAR is publicly released by the Fed. It is a very tense day for
the banks. If you fail CCAR, there is enormous pressure on the market
to get it right the next time. You could look at the banks that failed
CCAR, and there are repercussions. People get fired. It is an event with
great consequences. The regulators are using all these tools today, I
think, in a very effective manner, and none of them are rooted in DoddFrank.
On that note, let me move briefly to Dodd-Frank. When you look at
Dodd-Frank, and I think when you look at any piece of financial
services legislation, the key is lowering your expectations. The political
process today makes it very hard to enact coherent, comprehensive
reform of our financial regulatory system. Dodd-Frank is an unfortunate
example of this. It was enacted in 2010 at a time when there was, and
continues to be, a significant amount of resentment towards Wall Street.
It is compounded by perceptions of outsized compensation packages. If
you add to all of that the fact that Dodd-Frank suffered from the election
cycle and politicians looking to foment and capitalize on populist anger,
the financial regulation is very complicated. It is highly technical. It is
almost like reforming the tax code. It is full of unintended
consequences. The financial industry had almost no influence in
Washington at that time.
Dodd-Frank itself was rushed to enactment. If you look at the
conference process, it was done in a few short months, and even then, it
was really done in episodic bursts of all-nighters, and not in a deliberate
process, which should have taken a year or more. Normally, banking
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legislation does that. So, it is not that surprising, when you think about it
that way, that you have an act, parts of which do not really provide any
benefits, and parts of which just do not make any sense at all.
I am not in the camp that is advocating that Dodd-Frank ought to be
repealed. There are portions of the act that I think are beneficial, and
they were a long time coming. It did away with the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the agency that regulated thrifts, which was largely
ineffective.51 It established an agency dedicated to consumer
protection.52 You may disagree with how aggressive they are, but I think
there was a need for something like that. Dodd-Frank also made a lot of
technical amendments to the banking laws that were very long overdue.
But, at the same time, it came in at an enormous, needless cost. It did a
number of things that did not need to be done. Eric talked about the
Volcker Rule.53 I think that is at the top of most people’s list. If you look
at what is happening in the trading markets today, especially for debt,
you have discouraged the largest banks from trading in those markets,
and you basically decrease their liquidity and increase their volatility,
and it is going to get worse if we approach another financial crisis.
Professor Squire talked about how Dodd-Frank curtailed the
Federal Reserve’s emergency lending powers. This was invaluable
during the crisis. Some have argued that this was necessary to reduce the
so-called moral hazard because if you have a Federal Reserve that can
bail out companies, you will encourage excessive risk taking. There was
a quote by Ben Bernanke where he said that limiting the Fed’s
emergency lending power is like “shutting down the fire department to
encourage fire safety.”54 It is just not a rational way to attack the
problem.
As for how effective all of this has been, not just Dodd-Frank, but
the other tools that I have talked about, I think it has been very effective.
I think the financial regulatory system is much tougher than it was. But
again, it is largely because of the efforts that started before Dodd-Frank.
It really was not because of Dodd-Frank.

51. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 312, 124 Stat.
at 1521-23.
52. Id. § 1011, 124 Stat. at 1964-65.
53. Id. § 619, 124 Stat. at 1620-31.
54. Ben S. Bernanke, Warren-Vitter and the Lender of Last Resort, BROOKINGS
(May 15, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/ben-bernanke/posts/2015/
05/15-warren-vitter-proposal [http://perma.cc/G8GW-KLQZ].
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That brings me to today’s regulatory environment. Where are we
today? What is today’s regulatory environment like? There has really
been a sea of change in the philosophy underlying bank regulation. As
the Fed would put it, they have shifted from what they would call microprudential concerns: ensuring that each bank had capital to prevent it
from failing, but just enough so that banks were not at the same time
compromising profitability, international competitiveness, and other
commercial considerations. They have changed to what they call macroprudential concerns: minimizing the possibility of another systemic
failure. That is a very different standard and requires an entirely
different level of capital. Now the Fed is demanding dramatically more
capital, looking holistically at the financial system, and they are really
not thinking anymore about maintaining profitability or international
competitiveness.55 I think we have some real problems because of that.
At the same time, capital levels, as a result, have increased sharply.56 For
the first time, capital requirements increase the larger and more complex
a bank grows because the failure of a large bank has more systemic risk
than the failure of a smaller one. We have other mechanisms that I am
sure you have heard about, such as living wills and other mechanisms
designed to make it more orderly if a large institution fails, and so there
is less disruption to the overall economy. We see the Fed reaching out to
try to regulate the non-banks, GE Capital,57 Prudential,58 and MetLife,59
the famous court case which I am sure you have read about.60 They are

55. Ryan Tracy, Victoria McGrane & Justin Baer, Fed Lifts Capital Requirements
for Banks, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2015, 8:29 PM) http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-setto-finalize-amount-of-capital-big-banks-must-maintain-1437410401 [http://perma.cc/N
J8N-EDTT].
56. See id.
57. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys. (July 20, 2015),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150720b.htm [http://perma.c
c/DJZ2-TUHF].
58. Financial Stability Oversight Council – Designations¸ U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/designations/Pages/default.aspx [http://perma.c
c/J8FU-MAU8].
59. Id.
60. Complaint, MetLife Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, No. 1:15-cv00045 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 13, 2015).
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going to try to reach into the shadow banking market.61 I think we will
see that in the coming year.
This shift in the regulatory philosophy has not just changed the
policy; it has really changed the sort of people that regulate banks. If
you look at what the Fed is doing today, it is a lot more data-driven. If
each of the large banks submits 10,000 pages on their capital plans,
regulation is much more data-driven than it was before. Banks now
submit an enormous amount of data to the Fed in the form of CCAR
stress tests and many other regulatory reports. All that data is centralized
in D.C. and analyzed there. What has happened is that the Federal
Reserve in D.C. has really sort of emerged with more prominence and
the local Reserve Banks have less authority and less autonomy. If you
look at the folks that are working at the Fed these days, they are
changing over. This is more of a data-driven process. It demands
younger employees that are more facile with computers and technology.
They are able to manipulate large, complex models. A consequence of it
is that you are seeing a lot of the veteran supervisors that had some real
judgment being pushed out and replaced by what I will call technocrats,
for lack of a better word. They have very little supervisory experience in
the field, let alone industry experience.
The net result of all this is that you have a lot less discretion these
days when there is a supervisory problem or an issue. The judgment by
the regulators can lead to very unfair results. A capital shortfall, a
regulatory violation these days, no matter how trivial, can lead to a
disproportionately harsh response. I think adding to this
disproportionality is that financial regulations have become very
politicized. Punishing banks and bankers is still very much a priority of
the current administration, and you are seeing the regulators continue to
follow this theme.
On September 9, 2015, the Department of Justice sent new policies
to its federal prosecutors across the country instructing them to increase
their focus on punishing individuals in cases of corporate misconduct,
and not just the corporations.62 I think this is a direct response to what
61. Christopher Condon & Ian Katz, Fed Focuses on Shadow Banking as It
Gauges Financial Risk, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Mar. 27, 2015, 12:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-27/fed-focuses-on-shadow-bankingas-it-gauges-financial-system-risk [http://perma.cc/7HF5-EPW7].
62. See generally Memorandum from Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to All U.S. Att’ys et al., Individual Accountability for Corporate
Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/dag/file/769036/download
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you see in the media. Why have we not seen more bankers gone to jail?
They are still on it, and this is still an issue and a priority. When Eric
Holder stepped down as Attorney General, he extracted more fines than
any other Attorney General from the banking industry, yet he was
widely criticized for not sending bankers to jail.63 With the presidential
elections next fall, I think you are going to continue to hear this refrain.
To get to the heart of the question, and the topic of the seminar, are
we better able to handle the next financial crisis? As far as the regulators
are concerned, we have seen a significant change in personnel, and they
are equipped with different tools. If you look at them, are they better
able to handle the next financial crisis than the regulators we had in
2008? I think of this question in three parts.
First, you think about the people manning the regulatory agencies,
you look at their supervisory tools, and then you look at the fragility of
the overall financial system. In 2008, I think the country was
extraordinarily fortunate to have Ben Bernanke as the chairman of the
Federal Reserve. As it happened, we had one of the guys who is a
leading scholar of the Great Depression. I think we were equally
fortunate to have Hank Paulson, who had just stepped down as CEO of
Goldman Sachs, as a Secretary of the Treasury. Together, they really led
the nation’s response to the financial crisis. I felt they acted with
courage and inventiveness. I do not think they have gotten their due
from history. They had an extraordinary set of lieutenants, some of the
most talented men and women in finance I have ever worked with. They
had accomplished backgrounds in M&A, capital markets, and corporate
finance. They were the exact skill sets we needed at the time. I had the
privilege of working with them on a number of different crises. I hope
they get the appreciation one day that they deserve. They made
countless rush decisions. When you hear about the bailouts being
criticized, I think it is important to keep in mind that these were done in
quick succession, typically very late at night, with very little sleep, but I
think, most importantly, with information that we all knew was

[http://perma.cc/C3M7-SS2A] (describing the Department of Justice’s new policy of
individual accountability).
63. See Tom Schoenberg, Holder Legacy on Financial Crime Cemented in Final
Year, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Sept. 25, 2014, 8:34 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ne
ws/articles/2014-09-25/eric-holder-legacy-on-financial-crime-built-in-final-year [http://
perma.cc/KNQ6-DAP3].
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imperfect and we all knew was incomplete. Yet, you had to make the
decisions.
I think, if you look at those people, they were remarkable people.
They were in D.C. because at that time and place it was considered a
fitting capstone, or an interlude in a career on Wall Street or in finance,
to serve some time in the public sector. That is not the case anymore,
unfortunately, and I think it is a real negative for us. There has been a lot
of negative press about the ties between Wall Street and Washington,
and you do not see that flow of people going from Wall Street to
Washington anymore. I think, almost to the contrary, when you look at
the senior-most regulatory positions, the ones that require Senate
confirmation, it is actually a negative to have had industry experience. I
think that is very much the wrong result. It is not to diminish the people
who operate the regulatory agencies today, but during the financial
crisis, we happened to have some spectacular dealmakers, which is
exactly what we needed, and now they are largely gone.
As far as supervisory tools, one of the great failings of Dodd-Frank
was cutting back on the Federal Reserve’s powers as a lender of last
resort that Professor Squire talked about. It is Section 1101 of the DoddFrank Act.64 It effectively precludes the Federal Reserve from using its
emergency lending power to lend to a company that is not a bank in
order to rescue it from bankruptcy or to take assets off the balance sheet
of a company. That was the key power that the Fed used to rescue Bear
Stearns, AIG, and people forget this, but they also used it to offer $300
billion in loss protection to Citigroup in 2008.65 You think of all three
and you think about all three failing. The economy would not have
survived it.
There are new tools that they have via Dodd-Frank. The FDIC has
broader resolution powers. They can now take over and operate a
distressed financial services company, much the same way that they can
with a failed bank. I think that is helpful. It means that liquidation is not
an automatic necessity, but in a crisis, it is hard to see this authority
being used, except in very rare circumstances. If you look at the times
64. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113-15 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343
(2012)).
65. See David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 24, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122747680752551447
[http://perma.cc/TB5G-S64K].
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the FDIC has actually stepped in and run a bank, I can think of one
instance, IndyMac, in the financial crisis.66 They generally do not do it
otherwise. It is a very hard thing to do.
I think as far as tools go, the regulators were better armed in 2008
than they are today because the Fed has less authority today than they
did before to handle a financial crisis. But, I think, at the end of the day,
the swing factor to me is that the financial system is better capitalized
today than it was before the financial crisis. That, to me, is the
difference that overwhelms everything else. It is the difference between
a fire in a wet forest versus a dry forest. If you go back to 2008,
fundamentally, we had a crisis of confidence. We now have dramatically
higher capital levels and liquidity levels. They are proven each year by
these comprehensive stress tests. For all these reasons, I think we are
marginally better able today to handle a financial crisis than we were
then.
RICHARD SQUIRE: Thank you, Eric and Richard. I actually have
questions for my co-panelists, but you all have been hearing from us for
a while. We want to give an opportunity for anyone who might want to
ask a question to go ahead and do so. Yes, ma’am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am with the insurance industry. I have a
question about Dodd-Frank and the rise of clearinghouses. You spoke
about systemic risk. I was wondering if you thought that clearinghouses
actually would increase systemic risk because of the capital
requirements for the clearinghouses.
RICHARD SQUIRE: Interesting. Would either of you like to talk
about clearinghouses?
RICHARD KIM: I think you raise an excellent point. You look at
what they are trying to do to banks. It is really spreading out risk, and
clearinghouses concentrate risk. You questioned the wisdom of that. I
am doubtful of that. I think you are creating more systematically
important entities via these clearinghouses, and it does not seem like a
wise thing to me.
RICHARD SQUIRE: I will note one thing on clearinghouses, so
we are not always agreeing on everything on this panel, as we seem to
be. In the United States, we have never had a major clearinghouse fail
66. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Establishes IndyMac Federal Bank, FSB as
Successor to IndyMac Bank, F.S.B., Pasadena, California (July 11, 2008),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08056.html [perma.cc/6BPD-L5NP].
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during a crisis. It has happened overseas, but it has never happened in
the United States. One reason, I think, is that clearinghouses are a little
bit unusual as a financial entity in that they do not have the maturity
mismatch that most institutions have. They generally have liquid assets
and short-term debts. They have short-term assets, for the most part, too.
They are really not vulnerable to the same type of liquidity run and the
same type of liquidity crisis that a depository bank, at the other end of
the extreme, would be.
There are reasons to think that, through their netting and setoff
functions, if one clearinghouse member fails and goes into bankruptcy
or into the Orderly Liquidation Authority,67 the clearinghouse can,
through a certain legal arrangement, tie off the payment of cash into the
bankruptcy estate, where it is not as valuable, and keep it out with the
other members, who may have a need for liquidity and cannot tap such
things as the Orderly Liquidation Authority’s provision that allows the
failed institution to borrow from the Treasury.68 So, I think there are
counterarguments here. I think there is an argument that, yes, you are
concentrating risk, but you are concentrating it in a type of institution
that is structurally more stable. There also may be liquidity allocation
advantages to clearinghouses.
You mentioned that you are in insurance. I think insurance is
another interesting type of institution because insurers also do not have
maturity transformation. They are in the financial world, but they are
generally kind of long on both sides. They do not have a lot of shortterm debt. Nobody thought that an insurer could be at the center of a
banking crisis, but AIG did things that insurers normally do not do. This
reinforces my sense—and this is something that Richard also said—that
while we do not know what the next crisis is going to look like, I do not
think that anybody thought that an insurer was going to be at the center
of the last crisis. It is just not in our model of how the financial sector
works. Regulators need, and the central bank needs, flexibility because
you never know when risk is going to manifest next.
Would anybody else like to offer a question? Yes, sir.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: With an increased trust in the market
since the financial crisis, and as the synthetic credit, such as CDSs and
CDOs, increases in usage, do you think that the provisions in place
could prevent an abuse similar to what we saw in the financial crisis?
67.
68.

12 U.S.C. § 5384 (2012).
See id. § 5381(a)(12); see also id. § 5390(n)(1).
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RICHARD SQUIRE: Eric, you talked a lot about confidence. Do
you think there is more confidence than there used to be?
ERIC GROSSMAN: I think there is certainly more confidence. I do
not want to quibble with the term “abuse.” You did say abuse of those
instruments. One of the great things about this country is that smart
people come up with interesting ways to distribute risk. A lot of the
derivatives that you saw were really quite valuable for distributing risk.
There was a real concern and fear that we were throwing the baby out
with the bath water post-crisis, and that all derivatives were bad. Warren
Buffett called them “financial weapons of mass destruction.”69 That is
just not the case.
There clearly was a place, I think, for greater transparency. I do
think there was, perhaps, excessive creativity. There was great
opportunity for short-term financial gain. For the most part, those
aspects of derivative trading are gone. My sense is that, as a result, the
trading that is now being done is at least more firmly in the heartland of
risk mitigation and diversification.
RICHARD SQUIRE: Richard, would you say that your clients,
through Dodd-Frank’s provisions and these other pre-Dodd-Frank
regulatory measures, have less flexibility in terms of the types of
derivatives they can write and the types of risks they can take through
that? Has this been a focus of regulators?
RICHARD KIM: I think very much so. I think they feel heavily
constrained. It is one of the provisions they complain most about.
RICHARD SQUIRE: Because it was very profitable or because
they actually think that derivatives were useful in off-laying risks that
now they cannot use them for?
RICHARD KIM: It is really more the latter because there is now
less flexibility to off-lay risk.
RICHARD SQUIRE: Interesting. Other questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am with a law firm in Midtown
Manhattan and represented the SIPC trustee in the liquidation of
Lehman Brothers. One of the things that we handled was the continuous
linked settlement issues (“CLS”), and we discovered, in the course of
that, that the Lehman executives, and almost everybody, did not
69. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Derivatives, as Accused by Buffet, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 14, 2011, 9:17 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/derivati
ves-as-accused-by-buffett/?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/CM4W-LQM8].
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understand CLS and the process by which the majority of foreign
exchange trading was handled through this system.
To what extent do you believe or do you understand that the
complexity of modern financial transactions and the inability of
financial executives to get a real handle on this complexity is making it
likely that these kinds of problems will occur again, because no one
really has a proper handle on them?
RICHARD SQUIRE: It is stunning that they did not understand
what CLS is. I do not understand either, so I am going to let Eric speak.
ERIC GROSSMAN: I think your question is a good one. It does
tend to relate to the danger that we have all tried to highlight here, which
is that you cannot let the sins of the past inform your perception of the
present. We could go on for hours in terms of the lessons that were
learned on the back of the crisis, but one thing is clear: the financial
services firms that were not banks or bank holding companies, of which
my firm was one, Lehman Brothers was another, and Goldman Sachs
too, we now all run ourselves like a bank. We are clearly far more
rigorous about documentation and about legal entity structure
management comprehension. We have invested billions of dollars in our
management information systems, our basic accounting and
documentation technology structures, all with the encouragement of the
Federal Reserve.
I will say that we have not spent a lot of time talking about the
living wills or the resolution process, which is really coming into its
own right as another pillar of the Federal Reserve and the FDIC’s tool
bag in terms of regulating banks. But all banks are being held to an
enormously higher bar in terms of the discipline that we have around
legal entity, an understanding of risk across geographies, and business
units. An enormous amount has been done. It is fair to say that a bit of
the learning here was informed by the Lehman debacle. There is no
question about that. I think we are all far more ready to withstand a
crisis, because we better understand where risk is across the
organization, and to the extent it ever became relevant, the sorts of
decade-long efforts to unwind Lehman Brothers are far less likely at any
major financial institution going forward.
RICHARD KIM: I think our clients have said the same thing. I am
speaking from the bank side. I cannot really speak for the end-user side,
be it a corporation or an individual, but these days there is so much more
process associated with rolling out transactions. The regulators have
made this so-called new product process a real priority. So, you have to
show a very thorough vetting. It makes banks slower to the market for
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new products, but having said that, it is much more thorough than it
used to be.
RICHARD SQUIRE: There is a theme here in some of these
questions that I want to use to ask an additional question of both Eric
and Richard, which has to do with the question of the opacity versus the
transparency of the distribution of risk in the financial system generally.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the hallmarks of a banking crisis is that
there are going to be losses, but nobody knows exactly where the losses
reside. So, everybody has a problem raising short-term cash. Depositors
rationally, because they are uninformed, run on everyone. There has
been a narrative told that derivatives exacerbated the opacity by making
it harder to know exactly where risk resided. One justification that has
been offered for clearinghouses is that they make it clear that the risk is
here, and the regulators can use the clearinghouse as a microscope
through which they can look into the financial system itself and see who
is on both sides of these transactions. Do you think we are in a better
position? Housing prices are going up again, but not very fast. Let’s say
they start going down again and we have $250 billion, just to throw out
a number, in losses on mortgages. Do we know better now who exactly
would be taking the losses and where the risk resides? What do you
think?
RICHARD KIM: I would like to say yes, but I do not know that we
do. That is a hard thing. We worked on the Treasury when they took the
conservatorship over Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.70 You are sitting in a
room and you are trying to figure out the consequences. If we were to
zero out the preferred, who would get hit? If we were to zero out
subordinated debt, who would get hit? No idea. You just cannot figure
this stuff out. I do not know that much has really changed.
ERIC GROSSMAN: I do not know if I would say that little has
changed, because there is, frankly, just less that one would need to
understand. There are far fewer complex derivatives. There is far less
trading of esoteric instruments. Take CDOs, for example. No one is
writing CDOs, certainly none of any real complexity. You would still
have a knotted ball to untangle, but it would be a much smaller, easier
one to untangle. And when you layer on all the things that we have done
70. Statement, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, Statement of FHFA Director James B.
Lockhart at News Conference Announcing Conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac (Sept. 7, 2008).
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around resolution and recovery inside the banks to better understand
where our own risks lie, from a booking model perspective and from a
legal entity perspective, we are clearly far better off in terms of
untangling the knot. I do not think there is any question about that.
But the fundamental issue was a very real one. During “Lehman
weekend,” down at the Fed, all the banks were called in because the
theory was that if everybody comes in we will figure out where the risk
is between everyone, we will just take Lehman out, and you will guys
will carry it and net it off amongst yourselves. Within a couple hours,
that proved to be a complete fool’s errand, both because Lehman itself
did not really have a good handle, for all the reasons that I spoke about
in response to the gentleman’s question, and also because there was
quite a bit of complexity.
RICHARD SQUIRE: My friend over here has a question.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, Professor Squire. I will ask
this question in terms of my personal capacity, not my job capacity. I
have heard Mr. Grossman, in particular, state that banks serve a purpose,
and they certainly do. They provide liquidity to commercial and
residential properties. There is an implication that they are almost like
utilities in certain ways. I am sure you would not characterize it that
way, but there is an implied guarantee by the government. I am just
wondering what the panelists would think about some sort of return to a
split between investment banking and commercial banking. Let us call
commercial banking what it is and give it government guarantees, and
the let the investment bankers take their chances in the marketplace,
rather than right now, where a lot of the banks at least have elements of
both and some sort of confused guarantee as to whether the government
would step in.
RICHARD SQUIRE: The dreaded Glass-Steagall question.71
Richard, I am happy to let you go first.
RICHARD KIM: I went to the Federal Reserve straight out of law
school in the 1980s. It was when we first started figuring out how to let
banks into the underwriting business at levels permissible under GlassSteagall, which was possible back then because it did not foreclose it,
but it just permitted it up to a very low level. I think at the end of the
day, though, when you look at what happened in the financial crisis, the
companies that had the hardest time were the investment banks that did
not have access to deposit funding, such as Lehman Brothers and Bear
71.

See generally Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162.
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Stearns. Merrill Lynch had to sell itself to Bank of America. Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley became bank holding companies. I think
history has shown that that sort of model cannot survive a financial
crisis, so I guess I never really saw the wisdom in going back to it.
ERIC GROSSMAN: If your fundamental view is that you do not
need investment banks, so they should go in a crisis, and then the
deposit-taking banks would stay, then you could go back to it. Those
guys would be hanging out there. I guess the commercial banks would
survive, but you sort of leap over the fact that there is a reason why the
strongest investment banks on the planet are here in the United States. If
you look at what is going on at European banks or Asian banks, none of
them provide the global comprehensive benefit to United States
multinational companies. We provide a vital service that is beneficial to
the economy. You could go back to Glass-Steagall. From Morgan
Stanley’s perspective, it would not be the end of the world. We are not
attached to a big deposit-taking bank like some of our competitors, but I
think for the United States it would be a complete and total disaster.
RICHARD SQUIRE: One of the things I like about that question is
that it reminds me of the difficulty that regulators have in limiting who
can take deposits. We have a traditional sense of what a deposit is, like a
checking account or a savings account. But we know, because people
are innovators, that other deposit-like products are sold, where
somebody gives money to a financial institution, or a company that is
not supposed to be a financial institution, but ends up acting like one,
and the agreement is that you can get your money back at any time.
Once you are selling something like that, you are susceptible to systemic
risk. Nontraditional bank deposits that have this character, including
broker-dealer accounts at investment banks, repos, and money market
mutual fund investments, can be run on too. So we seem to have this
inability to stop smart financial sector people from innovating and
inventing deposit-like substitutes outside the traditional depository
banks.
Are there further questions from anyone in the group?
Commissioner Gallagher.
DANIEL GALLAGHER: I had a theory back when I was in the
government that there is complete and utter confusion generally as to the
lender-of-last-resort role of the Fed. Go back to Bagehot, like you did in
your opening remarks, and ask, are they going to lend or not? In the next
crisis, is the Fed going to be there or not? I would say that I think there
is complete confusion as to that question. There is no clear answer, and
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that is a real problem for policymaking in the United States. I think a lot
of bad policy is made around this confusion. I personally think the Fed,
in particular, has made a lot of bad policy due to the specter of a
situation in which they cannot or will not lend, or there is confusion as
to whether they can or will lend.
So, I think this is actually a fundamental issue that has confused
policymaking since the crisis. It is one that both parties often get wrong.
It is one in which Republicans sometimes confuse and conflate lender of
last resort with bailout, which is a curse word to the party. It is also a
curse word to Democrats, who say, “No bailouts, never. We like big
government, but we do not like the Fed being that big,” but they do not
really get the fact that with Dodd-Frank, they have confused the
message here.
If you read Fed pronouncements, like the Governor Tarullo speech
that effectively says “We are never going to be able to lend again, and
so Morgan Stanley’s broker-dealer needs more capital, because we
cannot lend to them. They need 58% capital now.” This is really
efficient, by the way. And New York Fed President Dudley, whom I
respect tremendously, says, “We are going to have to lend to them if
2008 happens again, so give me a little more prudential supervision?” I
do not think he should get it, but I do respect that he is transparent in his
thinking. Those are two wildly divergent viewpoints within the broader
Fed family, but they are emblematic of the confusion around this issue.
I guess to Professor Squire, I want to get your take on whether this
is a bigger issue than simply Section 110172 and Section 13(3),73 and
what you think can be done about that.
RICHARD SQUIRE: Thank you for that. I very much agree. This
is something I was trying to say—that the problem is the regulatory
system, but it is not just the regulatory system. I call it the political
environment, but maybe it is also an institutional problem in the
government.
Let us go back to 2008. The Fed felt that, up to a certain point, it
could provide what I call lender of last resort, not bailouts. A bailout
sounds like a gift. It sounds like a handout. We did not have any actual
72. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1101, 124 Stat. 1376, 2113-15 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343
(2012)).
73. Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-301, § 201, 47
Stat. 709, 715 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343).
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handouts. We had loans or investments that were more or less risky. The
riskier it is for the taxpayer, the more it is on the handout/bailout side.
So, the Fed did all of the direct lending to actual commercial banks,
which it is allowed to do under its regular statutory authority, but then it
started going forward and saying, “We are going to backstop Bear
Stearns. We are going to backstop AIG.” At some point, the Fed said,
“This emergency power that we have,” which was fairly broadly written
and, arguably, maybe still is, although it has been curtailed a bit, “it just
is not enough for us.” Who would have standing to sue the Fed to say,
“No, you were not allowed to give Lehman Brothers the same deal you
did AIG”? It is not clear whether anyone would have had standing to
legally stop that.
I think the Fed said at some point, “We do not feel comfortable
politically. We do not feel comfortable as a constitutional matter. We
feel like we need political cover.” That is what gave us TARP. There
was a sense that the Fed was thinking “There is some uncertainty here
about our legal authority and our legitimacy in continuing to provide
money, and so we need political cover,” and so Congress gets involved,
and then we have TARP.
First of all, you are absolutely right. That creates uncertainty. What
will Congress do? This is where, I guess, Eric went to the ATM—the
first time when TARP failed in Congress.74 That is enough uncertainty
that Eric wants to take his money out. So, there is uncertainty about
what Congress will do. Also, Congress does not always do it right. I am
not going to malign Congress, but this is not their institutional expertise,
and they also have political considerations. They have constituencies
putting pressure on them. I feel that, to the extent that the message is
confused and there is continuing vilification of the people on both sides,
between the bankers who received the bailouts and are vilified and the
Federal Reserve officials, government officials, who provided them and
are to some extent either vilified, or, at a minimum, what is said is that
they were providing a necessary but evil function, this is something that
we want to avoid again.
ERIC GROSSMAN: Any rational thinking on this is ignored. You
have vilification and no one actually wants to hear. Long enough has
74. See e.g., Carl Huse & David M. Herszenhorn, Defiant House Rejects Huge
Bailout; Next Step Is Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/
2008/09/30/business/30bailout.html [perma.cc/TXR6-5ZHK].
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gone by, let us go back and look at what happened. I think the FCIC was
a terribly lost opportunity to actually get people totally apolitical and
disinterested, and to look at what happened and say, this is what
happened, so how do we make the country better? That was a real lost
opportunity. Frankly, that has led to this terrible feedback loop. The
vilification continues because the narrative that is helpful to everybody
on both ends of the spectrum, Republicans and Democrats, is lost. There
is no definitive answer, which is why I am hoping your book is going to
be that.
RICHARD SQUIRE: Thank you. Dan, you can give some sense of
this. You were not at the Fed. You were the SEC. How responsive do
you think that somebody who is even supposed to be from an
independent agency, like the SEC or the Fed, is to political pressure?
My sense is that at some point, even in the independent agencies, people
say, “This is a political hot potato,” and that contributes to this
uncertainty.
DANIEL GALLAGHER: Going back to what was eons ago when I
was in the government, my working thesis was I think that it works for
the Fed. It does not work for other agencies whose registrants are
affected by this confusion. If you are at the SEC and you have primary
jurisdiction over the Goldman Sachs broker-dealer, for example, and
now Goldman Sachs is within a bank holding company and the Fed has
primary jurisdiction over that bank holding company, it is to the Fed’s
benefit that there is confusion about the Fed’s ability to lend to that bank
holding company and its subsidiaries in a time of stress. If you are the
primary Fed governor for supervision, you can say in a speech, “We
would like that broker-dealer to have a lot more capital that far exceeds
what the SEC rules require, because maybe, if everything goes wrong,
we might have to lend,” or “maybe if something goes wrong, we cannot
lend.”
The confusion feeds into this notion that something needs to be
done, but what? I gave a whole speech once on theories of capital that
go right to this issue.75 The theory of capital on the broker side is winddown capital. You have enough capital around to wind the firm down
and give the assets back to the clients. It is not this sort of riskmitigating, shock-absorbing, keep-the-run-away-from-the-taxpayer level
75. Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, SEC, The Philosophies of Capital
Requirements (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/137054
0629644 [http://perma.cc/EM7Y-4XZH].
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of bank capital that the Fed is used to. This is hugely important because
the two are very different. There is an optimal level of capital,
depending on the philosophy. Under the SEC theory of capital, you want
to have enough to be safe to turn the lights off and give the assets back,
but once you start getting into more than that, that is an inherent
inefficiency in the market and makes no sense. Why? Say you go from
10% to 15%, for example. What is that 5% going to do in 2008?
Nothing. Instead of going after that extra 5%, you are better off figuring
out how to take that broker-dealer and wind it down more smoothly than
we did with Lehman.
I do think it is a little bit more nefarious than it may seem. It is not
just the Fed saying, “Oh, my goodness, Congress might come after us
again.” To be clear, as much skepticism as I have of central banks as
supervisors generally, I think the Fed did bear the brunt of 2008. You
remember, of course, that the Fed was going to be the systemic risk
regulator, until early 2009, until the AIG bonuses were paid out, until
Senator Chris Dodd had to have a hearing and got blasted by
constituents and other members of Congress.76 Then, all of a sudden,
Sheila Bair came along with the FSOC and that changed a key
component of Dodd-Frank.77 I think you can trace it all back to the
confusion of this role of lender of last resort. If you are going to say that
the Fed should not do what they did, you really do have to ask whether
we should have a Fed. The role of lender of last resort in 1913 was the
main reason to create a central bank. They wanted to stop this cycle of
runs that Bagehot wrote so well about in the 1870s.78
I think, until and unless we are brave enough to get to that core
issue, and I am sure your book does it, but until we are going to do that,
we are going to dance around these other issues. We are not going to get
at the core of it. I find it frustrating. It suits the needs of certain
constituencies a lot better than others.

76. See Mark Landler & Steven Lee Myers, Buyout Plan for Wall Street Is a Hard
Sell on Capitol Hill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24. 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/24/
business/economy/24fannie.html [http://perma.cc/E9JF-3ABF].
77. See John Rogers, CFA Institute Co-Sponsors Systemic Risk Council Led by
Former Bank Regulator Sheila Bair, CFA INSTITUTE (June 6, 2012), http://blogs.cfainst
itute.org/marketintegrity/2012/06/06/cfa-institute-co-sponsors-systemic-risk-councilled-by-former-bank-regulator-sheila-bair/ [http://perma.cc/62UV-D8C6].
78. BAGEHOT, supra note 32.
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RICHARD SQUIRE: We will take a break now. Just a bit of a
preview of what is going to happen in fifteen minutes. We will have our
break and then Commissioner Gallagher will give his keynote address.
Sometimes we have a problem at law schools and other
academic institutions where current or even former government officials
do not want to say anything too controversial, and so they give speeches
that are not particularly interesting. They do not say things like
“nefarious,” for example. You just heard from Commissioner Gallagher
that he is not that type, so get ready for a stem-winder. I want to thank
my co-panelists for joining me today. Thanks for your attention.
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KEYNOTE ADDRESS
RICHARD SQUIRE: Welcome back. It is my great pleasure to
welcome back to Fordham Mr. Daniel M. Gallagher, Jr., who just
completed his term as a Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange
Commission.79 It has been about a month since he stepped down, and he
says he is busier than ever, but he still has the opportunity to come here
and be with us, and that is wonderful.
During his time as a Commissioner at the SEC, Mr. Gallagher
focused on initiatives aimed at strengthening our capital markets and
encouraging small business capital formation, including staunchly
supporting the changes introduced by the JOBS Act. He was an
outspoken and frequent advocate for conducting a comprehensive
holistic review of equity market structure issues, increasing the
Commission’s focus on fixed income markets, both corporate and
municipal, addressing the outsize power of proxy advisory firms, and
eliminating special privileges for credit-rating agencies, who should
have borne more of the brunt of our criticism when we talked about the
financial crisis than they did.
He has also addressed the creeping federalization of corporate
governance matters and the concerted efforts of special interest groups
to manipulate the SEC’s disclosure regime to advance their political
agendas. He has also been instrumental in educating the markets and
investors about the shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank Act and the
encroachment of bank regulatory measures and prudential measures into
the capital markets. In addition, Mr. Gallagher has been an outspoken
critic of the disturbing trend toward empowering supranational groups to
enact one-world regulation outside established constitutional processes.
Before he joined the Commission, in the private sector, Mr.
Gallagher advised clients on broker-dealer regulatory issues and
represented clients in SEC and SRO enforcement proceedings as a
partner with the Washington, D.C. law firm WilmerHale, where he
began his career. He also served as the General Counsel and Senior Vice

79. Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, SEC, Statement of Commissioner Daniel
M. Gallagher on His Departure from the SEC (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/
statement/statement-commissioner-gallagher-on-departure-from-sec.html [http://perma.
cc/4EH9-7LR4].
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President of Fiserv Securities, Incorporated, where he was responsible
for managing all of the firm’s legal and regulatory matters.
He first joined the Commission as a summer honors program intern
while pursuing his law degree, focusing on enforcement. In January
2006, he rejoined the agency, serving first as counsel to SEC
Commissioner Paul Atkins, and later as counsel to SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox, working on matters involving the Division of
Enforcement and the Division of Trading and Markets.
Mr. Gallagher earned his J.D., magna cum laude, from the Catholic
University of America, where he was a member of the law review, and
graduated from Georgetown University with a degree in English.
Just yesterday, Mr. Kim’s firm, Wachtell Lipton, issued a memo
honoring Mr. Gallagher and celebrating his service to the country as the
SEC Commissioner.80 I have a copy here, and I am going to read it in its
entirety—no, I am not going to do that. But it is excellent, and you
really should take a look at it. It will be available on Wachtell Lipton’s
website. But I want to read just two excerpts that I thought were
excellent.
The memo says, in part, that Commissioner Gallagher was a
champion of free and efficient markets. He promoted capital formation
and the growth of small businesses. With well-crafted and
charismatically delivered speeches, he has energized debates and will be
recalled as an advocate for market-oriented reform. The memo also
noted something else. A lot of Dodd-Frank is a series of directives to
agencies, such as the SEC, to enact rules implementing certain broad
principles or guidelines. The Commission has struggled to write all of
the rules that were required for it to write, even though the statute has
now passed its fifth-year anniversary. Earlier this year, as the memo
from Wachtell Lipton noted, Commissioner Gallagher gave the
Commission a grade of “incomplete” on its regulation of capital
formation. But his service as a Commissioner merits an A. Wachtell
Lipton does not give A’s very often, so that is a very high distinction. I
am very pleased to introduce Commissioner Gallagher.

80. David A. Katz & Laura A. McIntosh, Commissioner for Capital Markets:
Daniel M. Gallagher’s SEC Legacy, N.Y. LAW JOURNAL (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202740951943/Commissioner-for-Capital-Ma
rkets-Daniel-M-Gallaghers-SEC-Legacy?slreturn=20151024113206 [http://perma.cc/8
QHL-A86D].
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COMMISSIONER GALLAGHER: If only Wachtell Lipton had
been Georgetown University, things would have been a little different.
Thank you very much, Professor Squire, for that overly kind intro. It is a
real honor to be back here at Fordham Law School. It is just about a year
since you honored me by asking me to deliver the keynote address at the
Al Sommer Lecture.81 As Professor Squire mentioned, I left the
Commission earlier this month. Today is four weeks since I left, and I
have to tell you, I am a little bit lost. I have done a couple of speeches
since then, and I am lost not having to deliver a disclaimer to you before
I get going here. I am not sure how to do these speeches these days
without it. So, I am going to try one out on you, a new one I have been
working on, and say that the views I express today are my own and
unfortunately do not represent the views of the SEC or a majority of the
commissioners, but they should.
All kidding aside, the topic of today’s conference, “Are We Ready
for the Next Financial Crisis?” is actually very timely in light of the
recent fifth anniversary of Dodd-Frank, the so-called Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act. As you know and as you have
heard today already, Dodd-Frank was the congressional and Obama
Administration response to the financial crisis.82 It is fitting that the
traditional five-year anniversary gift is wood, because Dodd-Frank is
just one big wooden nickel sold to the unsuspecting public. As such, my
assessment of the question posed today is that we are certainly not ready
for the next financial crisis. Indeed, we have not even figured out what
caused the last one. And that is, in large part, due to the gimmickry and
false advertising surrounding the Dodd-Frank Act.
Dodd-Frank was a kneejerk, ill-informed, partisan response to the
financial crisis that, at best, has only kicked the proverbial can down the
road, leaving issues that may cause the next crisis unaddressed and
ignored. Congress cobbled together the 2319 pages of the Dodd-Frank
Act out of a hodgepodge of provisions and wish-list items long desired
and advocated by special interest groups. It is truly frightening. Along
81. Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, SEC, The Securities and Exchange
Commission – The Next 80 Years: The Fifteenth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on
Corporate, Securities, and Financial Law, (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Sp
eech/Detail/Speech/1370543190122 [http://perma.cc/JC7G-GEGV].
82. Wall Street Reform: The Dodd-Frank Act, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehou
se.gov/economy/middle-class/dodd-frank-wall-street-reform
[http://perma.cc/7VPX2VPD].
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those lines, since tomorrow is Halloween, I will reprise one of my
favorite Dodd-Frank monikers: “Dodd-Frankenstein.” Very few of these
wish-list items had a nexus with the actual causes of the financial crisis,
and they certainly were not germane to the mission of the SEC. Instead,
they were designed to fulfill the long-held ambitions of these special
interest groups, as well as policymakers and bureaucrats.
But it was natural and expected that Congress would respond to the
tragic financial crisis of 2008, just as it did in response to the 1929 stock
market crash, and, for that matter, the back-office crisis of the late
1960s, the insider trading scandals of the 1980s, and the accounting
scandals of the early 2000s. However, unlike the deliberate responses to
these other crises, Congress rushed to judgment in responding to the
2008 financial crisis, passing the Dodd-Frank Act even before its own
commissioned report, the FCIC report that Eric Grossman referred to a
few times, was even finished.83 Dodd-Frank also was enacted before the
report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations was finished.84
Dodd-Frank stands alone as the only piece of major securities
legislation in United States history that was rammed through Congress
without any meaningful bipartisan support. Yes, that is right; prior to the
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, every major piece of securities
legislation since the New Deal, including the Exchange Act,85 which
created the SEC, as well as the 1940 Acts,86 the 1975 Act amendments,87
the Remedies Act of 1990,88 the National Securities Markets

83.
84.

See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 9.
See generally COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOV. AFFAIRS, PERMANENT
SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, 112TH CONG., WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE (2011), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/imo/
media/doc/Financial_Crisis/FinancialCrisisReport.pdf?attempt=2 [http://perma.cc/3XN
T-6H94].
85. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
86. See Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64); Investment Advisers Act of
1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to
80b-21).
87. See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
88. See Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.).
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Improvement Act of 1996,89 and, very notably, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002,90 enjoyed bipartisan support. Despite the obvious dysfunction
in D.C. these days, it is possible to pass bipartisan financial services
legislation. Two years after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act,
Congress passed with overwhelming bipartisan support and President
Obama happily signed an important and impactful piece of federal
securities legislation, the JOBS Act.91 Again, the Dodd-Frank Act truly
stands alone.
To be sure, obtaining bipartisan support for the Dodd-Frank Act
would have been hard. But aren’t our elected officials put in office to do
hard things? It would have entailed tempering the statute through
compromise. Policymakers would have had to listen to competing ideas
and jettison some of the progressive wish-list items jammed into the
2300-plus-page behemoth. This lack of legislative debate set the stage
for some very dubious policy decisions, most notably, the empowerment
of the very regulators who failed so miserably in the years leading up to
the crisis.
Just for fun, let us think about the Dodd-Frank Act as a series of
comic books, each with a different set of superhero bank regulators,
tasked with slaying evil, albeit unnamed and poorly understood, villains
responsible for the financial crisis. The Fed is clearly Superman, with
his myriad powers. Dodd-Frank created the Fed-dominated Financial
Stability Oversight Council, or FSOC,92 the Fed-dominated SIFI
designation process,93 and the Fed-dominated Title VIII oversight
regime for clearance and settlement activities.94 Dodd-Frank also greatly
89. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
90. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
91. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
92. So-Yeon Lee, Review of Banking and Financial Law, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 528, 528 (2011) (explaining the creation of the Financial Stability Oversight
Council).
93. Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Capital and Liquidity Standards Testimony
Before the Committee On Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Wash.
D.C., at 3 (2011), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo2011061
6a.htm [http://perma.cc/44TC-ARSD].
94. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., (July 30, 2012),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120730a.htm [http://perma.cc
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enhanced the Fed’s traditional oversight authority. The FDIC, the
Batman of our financial-comics universe, was given the keys to DoddFrank’s shiny new Title II Orderly Liquidation Authority, as well as the
power to mandate so-called living wills.95 As for the OCC, well, I
understand there is an Aquaman movie scheduled for 2018. The point is,
in the comic book world of Dodd-Frank, the bank regulators are
superheroes. Funny, though, it did not seem superhuman when the
commercial banks they supervised were failing in 2007 and 2008. While
Dodd-Frank gave prudential regulators greatly broadened prudential
authority over the economy, the SEC was tasked with writing long,
complicated rules to interpret and implement many ill-formed mandates.
In this regard, and to complete the cartoon metaphor, the SEC was
treated by Dodd-Frank like a minion.
I spent much of my four years on the Commission working on and
speaking about some of the most egregious and irrelevant of these
Dodd-Frank rulemaking mandates. The early part of my tenure as a
Commissioner featured the sociopolitical conflict minerals and
extractive resources mandates that the SEC spent the better part of two
years implementing between 2010 and 2012.96 And, in case you have
not noticed, and there is a reason you have not noticed because people
do not want you to notice, the SEC is still in active, mostly losing,
litigation on both of those rulemakings. Mind you, the SEC got to work
on these misguided rulemakings immediately after Dodd-Frank was
enacted, to the exclusion of matters actually related to the financial crisis
or the agency’s core blocking and tackling duties. While the elimination
of gang violence in the Congo is a laudable goal, I am 100% sure that a
lack of corporate disclosures about Tantalum did not bring down
Lehman Brothers or AIG.
The Commission also created an entirely new regulatory regime for
municipal securities advisors and rushed to put out rules under Title IV
of the Dodd-Frank Act to regulate hedge funds and private equity funds,
/7W43-EDLA] (stating the passage of Regulation HH which establishes riskmanagement processes for “clearing and settlement activities” for financial market
utilities).
95. Press Release, FDIC, FDIC Board Issues Proposed Rule on Dodd-Frank
Resolution Authority (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2010/pr10
224.html [http://perma.cc/DK3F-EPPZ].
96. See Conflict Minerals; Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers,
77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240, 249, and 249b
(2012)).
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despite the lack of any evidence whatsoever that any of these entities
contributed to the crisis. Then came the Volcker Rule, despite the fact
that the rule’s namesake, as well as the then-Secretary of the Treasury,
who presided over the creation of the Dodd-Frank Act, both publicly
stated that its subject, proprietary trading, had nothing to do with the
financial crisis.97 Most recently, in August, the Commission, on a 3-2
vote, adopted a rule requiring public companies to disclose the ratio of
CEO compensation to their median employee.98 In my dissent in that
vote, I noted that that rule, which was inserted into the legislation by
special interest groups literally at the eleventh hour, may very well have
been the most useless of all of the Commission’s Dodd-Frank mandates.
And that says a lot. The AFL-CIO, which lobbied relentlessly for the
rulemaking mandate’s inclusion into Dodd-Frank, helpfully explains for
us on its website its true purpose, and I quote: “Disclosing this pay ratio
will shame companies into lowering CEO pay.”99
Will this costly, irrelevant, and burdensome rule, designed purely to
shame CEOs, prevent the next financial crisis or in any way address the
failures of 2008? The answer is clearly no. But to be fair, despite its vast
shortcomings, the Dodd-Frank Act actually did address a few sources of
97. See Kim Dixon & Karey Wutkowski, Volcker: Proprietary Trading Not
Central to Crisis, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2010, 4:55 PM) (quoting Paul Volcker:
“proprietary trading in commercial banks was there but not central” to the financial
crisis), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/30/us-financial-regulation-volcker-idUS
TRE62T56420100330 [http://perma.cc/9NAD-N77L]; see also Volcker Rule is the
Wrong Response to the Financial Crisis, FINANCIAL SERVICES FORUM: FORUMBLOG
(Sept. 19, 2009) (quoting Treasury Secretary Geithner: “If you look at the crisis, most
of the losses that were material for the weak institutions — and the strong, relative to
capital — did not come from [proprietary trading] activities. They came
overwhelmingly from what I think you can describe as classic extensions of credit”),
http://financialservicesforum.org/2010/05/volcker-rule-is-the-wrong-response-to-thefinancial-crisis/ [http://perma.cc/U67W-PSKJ].
98. See Press Release, SEC, Rule Implements Dodd-Frank Mandate While
Providing Companies with Flexibility to Calculate Pay Ratio (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-160.html [http://perma.cc/5LTX-LCS7].
99. Andrew Ross Sorkin, S.E.C. Has Yet to Set Rule on Tricky Ratio of C.E.O.’s
Pay to Workers’, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 26, 2015, 8:17 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/tricky-ratio-of-chief-executives-pay-toworkers/ [http://perma.cc/CJH5-G6CV]; Christopher Matthews, The Government
Regulation Corporate America Hates Most, TIME (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/09/20/the-government-regulation-corporate-americahates-most/ [http://perma.cc/8EAH-AD56].
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the 2008 financial crisis. It did, for example, mandate that federal
agencies remove references to nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations, or NRSROs, from their rules and forms.100 Unlike the
examples I cited earlier, an overreliance on credit ratings was indeed at
the heart of the collapse of securitized products that played a key role in
the financial crisis. However, it took until last month for the
Commission to finalize the removal of ratings references from our rules
governing money market mutual funds, and the Commission still has
work to do to fully implement the ratings removal requirements of
Section 939(a) of Dodd-Frank.101
There are some provisions of Dodd-Frank that appear facially
relevant to the financial crisis, but truly were part of a larger, long-pentup, command-and-control program. For example, Title VII of DoddFrank mandated the Commission to regulate securities-based swaps.102
Of course, it separately mandated that the CFTC regulate all other
swaps, about 95% of the notional value of the OTC derivatives
market.103 This split jurisdiction is silly and confusing, much like having
a separate commodities and futures regulator is silly and confusing, and
the line drawing to allocate responsibility between the agencies would
make congressional gerrymanderers proud. Speaking as someone who
was on the thirtieth floor of Lehman the week of September 15, 2008, I
can tell you that over-the-counter swaps did not cause the financial
crisis, but I can also tell you that increased transparency into these
markets would have been incredibly helpful and could have staved off
some very bad bailout decisions. But instead of incremental change, like
mandated transparency, Title VII creates a broad and overly heavyhanded regulatory construct, imposing an equities market structure on an
inherently OTC market. Last month I, along with my friend and former
colleague Commissioner Michael Piwowar, called on the Commission
to finalize these Title VII rules, which was especially important given
that the CFTC completed its rules governing swaps two years ago.104 We
100. See Removal of Certain References to Credit Ratings and Amendment to the
Issuer Diversification Requirement in the Money Market Fund Rule, 80 Fed. Reg.
58,123 (Sept. 25, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 270 and 274).
101. See id.
102. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
111-203, tit. VII, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641-1802 (2010).
103. See id. § 712, 124 Stat. at 1641-46.
104. Daniel M. Gallagher & Michael S. Piwowar, SEC, Statement Regarding
Security-Based Swap Rules (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/gallag
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noted that, instead of focusing on completing these rules, the
Commission has been asked to consider wholly political Dodd-Frank
rules such as the pay ratio proposal.
The Dodd-Frank Act has created collateral consequences that will
likely only accelerate the next financial crisis and will definitely not
serve to prevent one. First, the approximately 100 Commission
rulemaking mandates required by Dodd-Frank have shifted important
Commission resources away from addressing issues intended to prevent
the next systemic market events, or, worst-case scenario, another
financial crisis. The very volume of the Dodd-Frank Act’s prescriptive
mandates to the SEC has had the unintended effect of significantly
limiting the agency’s ability to bring its traditional expertise and
judgment fully to bear in the rulemaking process. In that sense, it has
had a negative impact on the Commission’s ability to develop sound,
sensible regulation and to adapt quickly and flexibly to the continuing
transformation of global capital markets. I have spoken many times
about these important yet forgotten priorities, including, among others, a
comprehensive review of our equity market structure rules and updated
transfer agent rules.
The Dodd-Frank Act was built on a false narrative of Wall Street
greed and regulatory failures. While these two factors certainly played a
role in the crisis, they were not fundamental, underlying causes of the
crisis so much as symptoms of a much larger illness: failed federal
housing policy. Policymakers who played a role in the irrational
exuberance of the housing markets in the years leading up to the
financial crisis understandably were not interested in revisiting and
shining a light on their pre-crisis actions when they drafted the
legislative response to the crisis. Indeed, the words “Fannie Mae” and
“Freddie Mac” do not appear in the Dodd-Frank Act in any substantive
way, and after recent administration pronouncements, it seems that
failed housing policy will not be addressed anytime soon. In fact, seven
years after the beginning of the financial crisis, Freddie Mac and Fannie
Mae have morphed into a pair of two taxpayer-owned zombie banks—
another Halloween theme—that continue to be the nerve center of the
U.S. housing markets. This failure to address the fundamental housing
issues that underlay the past financial crisis may very well be setting up
another financial crisis tied to the housing market, as housing prices
her-piwowar-security-based-swaps.html [http://perma.cc/2VXF-H5ME].
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reach pre-bubble levels, and the Fed’s lack of courage on monetary
policy is not helping the situation, that is for sure.
Earlier this year, my good friend Peter Wallison of the American
Enterprise Institute, the author of the must-read book on the crisis—
okay, one of the must-read books on the crisis when Professor Squire’s
comes out—called Hidden in Plain Sight, pointed out that the
administration was going back to the very same housing policies that
were pursued before the financial crisis, including reducing
underwriting standards for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and reducing
the insurance premiums for risky mortgages they take on, which were
the very things that caused the financial crisis by building up lowquality mortgages.105
Separately, I have spoken many times in the past about another
significant set of risks that have been brewing in the U.S. fixed income
markets, which could have serious repercussions for investors and the
U.S. economy as a whole. Since the release of a certain book early last
year, the impact of high-frequency trading on our equity markets has
been the topic du jour. However, as I have stated many times before, if
we are setting our regulatory agenda based on Michael Lewis books, we
need to address Liar’s Poker106 before Flash Boys.107 Twenty-six years
after the publication of the former tome, our fixed income markets are
shockingly similar to and include many elements unchanged from those
described by Lewis in 1989. In any case, the debt markets that are the
subject of Liar’s Poker are crucial to the U.S. capital markets. The
numbers speak for themselves. Municipal bonds, of which there are
approximately $3.7 trillion outstanding, allow state and local
governments to finance their infrastructure projects and provide for cash
flow and other government needs. They also constitute a large
percentage of retail investors’ retirement assets.108

105. See PETER WALLISON, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: WHAT REALLY CAUSED THE
WORLD’S WORST FINANCIAL CRISIS AND WHY IT COULD HAPPEN AGAIN (2015).
106. See MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON
WALL STREET (1989).
107. See MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014).
108. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
U.S.: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC
ACCOUNTS at tbl. L.212, http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1.pdf
[http://perma.cc/9XWK-484A] (providing market capitalization numbers for municipal
securities).
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Meanwhile, the corporate bond market enables companies to
operate and grow their businesses through capital investments. There is
over $11 trillion outstanding in the corporate debt markets.109 The value
of U.S. corporate bond issuances in 2014 reached a record of more than
$1.4 trillion, and we are on pace to eclipse that number this year. The
average daily trading volume for fixed income securities of all kinds just
this August was $135 billion. It is undoubtable that the search for yield
arising from more than six years of near-zero interest rates is driving
investors into the debt markets. Yet, as I have repeatedly pointed out,
despite these record issuances of corporate bonds, dealer inventory and
liquidity in the secondary markets has dramatically decreased. Even the
Chair of the Financial Stability Board, Mark Carney, has acknowledged
that new prudential regulations have caused dealer inventories to drop.
As Chairman Carney has noted, “The time to liquidate a given position
is now seven times as long as in 2008, reflecting much smaller trade
sizes in the fixed income markets.”110 With a record notional amount of
outstanding corporate debt and dealers unable to commit capital and
hold significant inventories, there is a real liquidity crisis brewing.
A significant risk is that when the Fed starts to hike interest rates, if
that ever happens, investors may rush to exit their positions in highyielding but less liquid debt and may have severe difficulty in doing so.
Interestingly, while the biggest banks have cut back on their positions in
more risky debt, insurance companies and mutual funds have increased
their positions in those assets.111 These firms have boosted their holdings
of corporate and foreign bonds to $5.1 trillion, a 65% increase since the
end of 2008.112 This has offset the $800 billion decline in holdings at
banks and securities firms in the same period.113 Rather than banks
109. See id.at tbl. L.213 (providing outstanding notional values of corporate debt
and holdings of foreign issues by U.S. residents).
110. See Speech, Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of the
Financial Stability Board, The Future of Financial Reform (Nov. 17, 2014),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech775.pd
f [http://perma.cc/E73P-UZQZ].
111. See Lisa Abramowicz, Major Firms Are Saying the Stage is Set for Another
Crisis in the Bond Market, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Feb. 26, 2015, 11:38 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-26/ubs-to-invesco-detect-bondaccidents-brewing-in-unstable-markets [http://perma.cc/52XE-2BBV].
112. Id.
113. Id.
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holding the inventory, there are now ever-expanding bond funds that
own more and more risky debt, and it is unclear how institutional asset
managers and their clients will react when interest rates eventually rise.
To address this impending crisis, the SEC can and should take
several actions. As the primary regulator of the nongovernment fixed
income markets, the SEC needs to champion the tough reforms that are
needed to modernize the fixed income markets. First and foremost, the
SEC needs to bring transparency to the markets for retail investors by
requiring broker-dealers to disclose markups to customers of so-called
riskless principal trades, most of which are really just agency
transactions in sheep’s clothing. The SEC also needs to ensure that there
are no regulatory impediments to the development of electronic fixed
income trading platforms. They should work to reduce the number of
bespoke bond offerings in favor of encouraging more standardized
offerings, if that would result in more liquidity. The SEC needs to take
steps to facilitate bond market liquidity, ideally by working with the
industry and investors to create workable market-based solutions. We do
not need another Title VII.
Now that I am a near-private citizen, an unemployed one at that, I
can only hope, alongside all of you, that we are ready for the next
financial crisis. What I can say for sure is that the Dodd-Frank Act did
not address many of the root causes of the 2008 financial crisis. In some
cases, such as the Volcker Rule, the Dodd-Frank Act may have, in fact,
exacerbated factors that could lead to the next crisis, while in other
cases, such as the pay ratio rule, we have created enormous growthstunting costs for corporations while providing absolutely no benefit to
investors. Furthermore, risks within the real estate and fixed income
markets remain unaddressed, potentially setting us up for the next
financial crisis. Other than that, we are all good.
Thank you for inviting me today to discuss this important topic
with you and for your attention. I think we have some time here and I
would be happy to take some questions.
RICHARDS SQUIRE: Commissioner Gallagher has graciously
agreed to answer any questions. If anybody has a question, please go
ahead and raise your hand.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: My question is another derivatives-related
question. I am curious as to why the SEC has been so slow in enacting
regulations under Title VII when the CFTC has largely completed its
regulations.
DANIEL GALLAGHER: This is a pretty easy answer. A lot of it
you could read in between the lines of the speech I just gave. It is all
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about priorities in the agenda. I gave a speech last year literally called
“You Are What You Prioritize.”114 An agency like the SEC had, at the
time of Dodd-Frank, seventy-five years’ worth of federal securities laws
on the books, and Lord knows how many rules under those statutes,
many of which I mentioned in the speech.115 These are hugely important
and core federal securities laws, and when Dodd-Frank came along, it
did not get rid of those and create a new set of federal securities laws. It
amended the federal securities laws. So the SEC still had a day job, as I
used to say, the basic blocking and tackling of administering seventyfive years’ worth of highly technical securities laws, and then DoddFrank added to it roughly a hundred rulemaking mandates. If you think
about the average bandwidth at the Commission, and unless you are
there, it is really hard to understand, but a hundred rulemaking mandates
is about twenty times the normal load for the Commission. And that is
post-Sarbanes-Oxley, which spiked the average up itself.
How do you do twenty times the normal load while administering
seventy-five years’ worth of federal securities laws? It is hard to do.
You have five commissioners that need to vote on everything. You only
have so many staffers. You are an appropriated agency. As much as
people wanted endless resources to hire an endless number of staffers, it
did not happen. What should have been done or what could have been
done? As much as I do not like Dodd-Frank, had I been in charge, what
would I have done? I would have come up with a rational way to
approach the hundred mandates. In one speech I outlined how I would
have done it.116 I would have three buckets. In bucket one, of these
mandates, what is directly related to the financial crisis? Not a lot. In
bucket two, what is actually highly relevant? What is germane to the
SEC’s mission? In bucket three, include other things, such as pay ratio,
conflict minerals, or whatever you want to put in bucket three. You

114. Speech, Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, SEC, The Importance of the
SEC’s Rulemaking Agenda — You Are What You Prioritize, Remarks at the 47th
Annual Securities Regulation Seminar of the Los Angeles County Bar Association,
(Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370543283858
[http://perma.cc/XX9H-68P4].
115. Id.
116. Speech, Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, SEC, SEC Priorities in
Perspective (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171
491262 [http://perma.cc/69SS-BM99].
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could have proceeded along those lines: let’s prioritize this, then move
to this, and then leave pay ratio until the end.
But that is not what happened. Weeks after Dodd-Frank was
enacted, the Commission put out a proxy access rule that was later
overturned in the D.C. Circuit, stunting SEC rulemaking for months and
months and months, as the agency developed a new cost-benefit
paradigm.117 What did the Commission turn to after proxy access in
2010? In December of 2010, the proposal went out for conflict mineral
disclosure, mine safety disclosure, extractive resource disclosure. That
means that the Division of Corporation Finance at the SEC spent July of
2010 until December of 2010 working on those things. Maybe the
Division of Corporate Finance did not have anything better to do, but
that was taking up the Commission’s bandwidth at the time. The
Commission had better things to do, including addressing Title VII.
Chairman Gary Gensler and the CFTC, which has a much more
limited jurisdiction than the SEC and much more limited resources, but
a much more discrete jurisdictional authority, went right after Title VII.
That was their big task in Dodd-Frank. They went at it relentlessly. I tip
my hat to Chairman Gensler; he is a brilliant guy and a hard worker, and
he got it done, he got it done quickly, and he got it done before he left.
The SEC did conflict minerals, hedging disclosure, and pay ratio, and
we got sued on them and we are litigating them. The staff is writing
briefs on them instead of finishing Title VII. It is all about priorities, and
the priorities were, and in some ways are, still a mess. I think things
have gotten a little bit better as of late, but the fact that we are years
behind in Title VII is a real problem. I do not like Title VII, as you
might have read into my remarks, but guess what? 95% of the market is
covered by a regime that has existed for two years. It is like the hanging
chad in Florida. Let us just take the care of the 5%, get some surety, and
let folks work with a consistent regime, but it has not happened.
That was a very longwinded answer to your question. It is actually
quite simple: it is how you prioritize things. That is why Commissioner
Piwowar and I put that statement out before I left.
RICHARD SQUIRE: Other questions?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Since greed is part of human nature in the
investment community, do you think the people in the community are a

117.

Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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little more cautious, a little bit less likely to take dangerous speculative
action, because we might get in trouble with Dodd-Frank? Is it possible?
DANIEL GALLAGHER: I think that is one of these X factors that
folks do not ascribe enough to post-crisis, which is when things got
excessive. I do not say, as I did in the speech, there was no Wall Street
greed. I do not say that there were no regulatory failures because there
were. But Wall Street greed in an era of a bubble of any sort is going to
breed market behaviors that are irrational in some ways, and when the
bubble bursts, those market players, whether it is firms, people,
products, and sometimes investors, should bear the brunt of it. That is
just not what happened in 2008, in some ways.
I think the lessons learned in the private sector have resulted in
much more prudent risk management, outside of Dodd-Frank. The
government is never going to be able to manage risk in the private
industry. They tried it; it was called the Soviet Union and it did not
work. But some folks cannot learn that lesson and they want the nanny
state to try to protect everybody. They want an SEC enforcement lawyer
sitting next to every investor on their E*TRADE account saying “No,
no, no. You really don’t want to do that.” It cannot happen and it should
not happen. Markets need to operate.
I do think that there has been, from the private sector risk
management perspective, a change in behavior from 2008 and a real
learning about proper risk management. That is something the
government never could mandate. I think some mandated increased
disclosure and a heightened level of enforcement over these disclosures,
whether it be in the asset management industry or the brokerage
industry, is all a positive role played by the government, but I think the
notion that Dodd-Frank somehow fixed it is silly.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: So, people might be a little more careful
despite the law?
DANIEL GALLAGHER: It is human nature. Who wants their
business to be run into the ground? Who wants to sell toxic product to
clients, besides really bad people? And most people in any market are
good people. It is hard to say in Washington these days. Not everyone is
a felon. Not everyone should be “perp-walked” for operating in a private
market. You do not want to sell a product to a client that is going to
blow up on them because then they are not a client anymore. It is not
sensible business logic. Therefore, I think there have been private sector
corrections that are much more meaningful than anything you could put
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in a 2300-page piece of legislation, which, by the way, is about 2200
pages longer than any of the New Deal pieces of legislation.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I am curious about your thoughts on highfrequency trading. Do you think it should be a priority to deal with it?
DANIEL GALLAGHER: Again, it is another sort of market
reaction to governmental dicta when it comes to high-frequency trading.
I have been calling for years, starting with a speech in the fall of 2012,
for a holistic review of equity market structure. We thought at the time it
was the shot heard around the world, but we sit here, three years later
none the wiser.
One of the reasons I called for a review of the equity markets,
specifically, is that in 2005, the SEC proposed a rule called Reg. NMS,
and in 2007, that rule was implemented.118 It has been in effect for about
eight years. That rule, as you read in the Michael Lewis book Flash
Boys, actually mandated high-frequency trading in the equities markets.
Michael Lewis says it, and it is really what happened. The government
basically said that when you trade equities in the United States, the way
to do it is to compete on price and speed, so we are going to connect all
the exchanges, we are going to treat them like utilities, and we are going
to homogenize what otherwise was a very diverse set of factors that
investors consider when they trade. When you put speed into the
calculus, of course, you need big computers to satisfy that government
rule. Post-NMS you see the specialists of the New York Stock Exchange
washed out, and NASDAQ’s model prevailing, along with all of the new
electronic-based exchanges that have come thereafter. You basically
mandated high-frequency trading.
Now it is kind of fashionable in Washington to vilify highfrequency trading. When you see the Flash Crash of May 2010,119 this
recent August 24, 2015 failure at the New York Stock Exchange,120

118. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496 (June 29, 2005) (codified in 17 C.F.R.
pts. 200, 201, 230, 240, 242, 249, and 270).
119. Economist Online, One Big, Bad Trade, THE ECONOMIST, (Oct. 1, 2010, 6:42
PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2010/10/what_caused_flash_crash
[http://perma.cc/CJ95-UV9Q].
120. Bob Pisani, What Happened During the Aug. 24 ‘Flash Crash’, CNBC (Sept.
25, 2015, 3:59 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/25/what-happened-during-the-aug24-flash-crash.html [http://perma.cc/54U6-WD9S].
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where they were closed for a while, the Facebook IPO failure,121 and all
these other little market failures, people say, “Oh, my god, what’s going
on here?” and no one understands the market. It is just remarkable to me
that here we sit eight years after Reg NMS mandated high-frequency
trading, the SEC is still prone to vilify, as are other regulators in
Washington, high-frequency traders, but there has never been a
retrospective review of that rule to ask whether we are happy with what
we did here.122 We totally transformed equity market structure in the
United States. We mandated high-frequency trading. We can sit back
and be proud that Grandma Jones gets a $7.99 trade on her 100-share
IBM order. Is that not really the measure of good markets? If Grandma
Jones trades, and if she is going hold that for ten or fifteen years, it is a
pretty good deal. There is liquidity, but is that really the market we
want? We have never done that review.
The answer could be yes, by the way. I am not saying that I
disagree with where we are, but it is an arrogance of government to say,
“We don’t have to look back and decide.” The impulse of government is
to say, “Oh, my gosh, we have had an outage. Those damn market
participants. They must be up to something. It is not our rules, and it is
not even the law.” By the way, the laws are worse than the rules. I
mentioned the 1975 Act amendments. The 1975 view of the world
controls U.S. equity markets from a statutory perspective. 1975 was a
time very similar to 2009, which is not a good thing. You have to
question the law. You have to question the rules. Nobody is doing that.
We are just putting out more and more. Every time there is a market
failure, there is a kneejerk response.
One of the funniest things I will talk a little bit about is this new
notion in Washington after the Treasury Flash Crash of October of last
year.123 There was a report issued by the SEC, the CFTC, Treasury, and
121. Tim Worstall, The Failure of Facebook’s IPO, FORBES (May 20, 2012, 7:54
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/05/20/the-failure-of-facebooksipo/#6cf41d2a5c2f [http://perma.cc/46XV-ULWZ].
122. Jacob Bunge, A Suspect Emerges in Stock-Trade Hiccups: Regulation NMS,
WALL ST. J., (Jan. 27, 2014, 11:00 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527
02303281504579219962494432336 [http://perma.cc/KRW7-4XL7].
123. Tracy Alloway, Here’s What We Learned from the Official Report on the
‘Flash Crash’ Treasuries, BLOOMBERGBUSINESS, (July 13, 2015, 11:48 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-13/here-s-what-we-learned-fromthe-official-report-on-the-flash-crash-in-u-s-treasuries [http://perma.cc/E53A-NXEX].
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the Fed, talking about those events.124 It includes some vilification of
high-frequency trading. Treasury markets are totally different now. Eric
Grossman’s firm is no longer playing such a big presence in Treasury
markets, and it is no wonder as to why. High-frequency trading has
moved in. We had a Flash Crash and the government says, “Those highfrequency traders, I cannot believe them. What are they doing? They are
not going to stand in front of a moving bullet coming right at them, the
way Morgan Stanley used to? We cannot control them the way we
control Morgan Stanley. Let’s vilify them.” That is really what is going
on. It is not regulation, it is not the lack of liquidity, it is not the Volcker
Rule, it is not the Basel rules, and it is not CCAR or CLAR, or all of
these things that Eric was talking about that keep the dealers away from
these markets now because they are just not worth it for them anymore.
It is the high-frequency traders that have moved in to provide that
liquidity that used to exist through the dealers.
It carries in Washington. It is convenient in Washington because it
sounds like shadow banking markets. “High-frequency trading, they are
out to get you. Don’t look at us. Don’t open this curtain. It is highfrequency traders.” Not too many people want to stand in front of that
one, but I am one of the few. There are some bad practices in highfrequency trading. There are firms and individuals out there who just
simply do not provide liquidity to the markets, but take away both
liquidity and profits that they do not deserve. Committing capital is a
very American thing and you should get a return for committing capital.
If you are not, you have to question what they are actually providing. I
think that type of analysis and thoughtfulness is what you need in
Washington, but you are not going to get it right now.
A very longwinded response to the question, but I think highfrequency trading is providing needed liquidity right now, whether you
like the fact or not that it is fleeting compared to Morgan Stanley
standing there taking their lumps when the market moves against them,
and then having the Fed tell them to stand there and take it. Highfrequency trading is not going to do that, and that is what drives them
crazy because they cannot control it. In this day and age in Washington,

124. Joint Press Release, Dep’t of Treasury, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Fed. Reserve Bank, SEC, CFTC, Release of Joint Staff Report on October 15,
2014 (July 13, 2015, 11:30 AM), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other
/20150713a.htm [http://perma.cc/Y7AD-G7WW].
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they will try to find a way to control it because it is all about commandand-control.
RICHARD SQUIRE: You said in your remarks that if there had
been more transparency, and you were remembering being at Lehman
on September 15, 2008, then we could have avoided some of the worst
aspects of the bailouts. What were the worst aspects of the bailouts, in
your view?
DANIEL GALLAGHER: Before I was a Commissioner, I was on
the staff of the SEC. I ran the investment bank oversight side of the
Division of Trading and Markets. I started six weeks before Lehman, so
that was a great job choice. I always tell people it is not that I know
substantively more about these issues than everyone else, but if you
were there at the time and you saw all this stuff that is being written
about now, years later, and you lived through it and you saw how
decisions were made firsthand, it would have, I would hope and expect,
a major impact on you. To watch the government respond to something
like 2008, to see the dialogue, to see the imperfect information upon
which these crucial decisions were made, I have to tell you, is a scarring
thing to go through, to sit and realize that no one knew what AIG’s
positions were in derivatives, and that no one knew who the
counterparties were because there was no regulatory transparency and
much less market public transparency. I give Tim Geithner credit—in
the years leading up to the crisis, he led the voluntary push, first on
credit derivatives, and then on equity derivatives, to get the firms to file
the gold copy with DTC of their transaction details to try to start to size
these markets, and to try to understand which firms were most at risk.125
He had the right idea, but it was not in place by the time things blew up.
To me, it was this notion that we now have to pump AIG full of
money because we have imperfect information. We have to fear the
worst, and we have to move in. I think, based on what you knew postcrisis, you might have decided differently. You might have said it might
be all right if they go under. I think that transparency would have been
critical to decision making. This is something, even as a very freemarket, small-government conservative, I can get my head easily
125. Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Jeff Gerth, As Crisis Loomed, Geithner Pressed but
Fell Short, WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 3, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/04/02/AR2009040203227.html
[http://perma.cc/FG962YYK].
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around. Despite it coming from the New Deal, and the 1933 and 1934
Acts, the idea of transparency and disclosure, either to regulators or the
markets generally, of material information is something that makes a lot
of sense. This makes a lot of sense so long as you are not taking too
much property from somebody. In this instance, when you have a $700
trillion notional market in swaps, a little bit of transparency would have
gone a long way.
But you open yourself up to all of the second-guessing. “Oh, you
only bailed out AIG because Goldman was a counterparty,” or, “You
bailed out the European banks.” I do not think they did because I was in
those rooms at the New York Fed, and I was in those rooms at Lehman,
and I do not think that is what the thought process was, but you do you
open yourself up to that narrative, and it can get kind of ugly.
If I had to write Title VII it would be one sentence: “You shall
disclose to X regulator all positions in OTC derivatives.” Then it could
have been five, ten, twenty pages of authority to the right regulators, to
say, “Not earlier than three years after sentence one is enacted, you can
do this: you can mandate more disclosure, you can mandate central
clearing, you can mandate equities-like trading, if you think it is the
right thing based on three years of experience in markets that you have
never regulated before.” That is humility. That is the government
saying, “Gosh, we really did not get it, did we? We bailed out AIG and
we did not have to.”
It would have made a lot of sense, but instead they just went for the
whole mousetrap: thirty pages of complicated equities-like market
structure being overlaid on OTC swaps markets and dividing the
jurisdiction over these markets between the SEC and the CFTC. I did
not even get to that fun part, by the way. The Dodd-Frank Act said it
was going to clean up the alphabet soup of Washington. It got rid of
OTS and created four more regulators, and it did not merge the SEC and
the CFTC.126 So we are in a position where the rules have been done for
two years, and you cannot really trade swaps unless you trade all of the
swaps in a meaningful way. Anyway, I could go on and on and on,
Professor. Did I answer your question?
RICHARD SQUIRE: Yes. Another question?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I think there have been a few allusions
today to shadow banking practice. I think that is one of the commonly
126. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, tit. III, 124 Stat. 1376, 1520-70 (2010).
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levied criticisms against Dodd-Frank, that it is pushing borrowers
towards money markets and hedge funds and the like. I think the
Financial Times reported in May that just over half of new home
mortgages are being issued by institutions with no depositors.127 Is that
something that needs to take a more central focus in forecasting what the
next crisis looks like, or are the current measures in Dodd-Frank
sufficient to curb the riskiest practices?
DANIEL GALLAGHER: This is an interesting question. Shadow
banking is loosely defined by me as non-bank markets. Bank regulators
like to call it something ugly to scare you into thinking it is scary. It is
capital markets, the non-bank capital markets, which in the United
States provide 80% of the financing for our economy, which, by the
way, in Europe provide 20% of the financing for the European
economy.128 No wonder the Financial Times is writing about how bad
shadow banking markets are.
There are all these initiatives and this lore that is put out there after
the crisis that the shadow banking markets are the riskiest part of our
markets, that the prudential regulators, the central bankers, and other
bank regulators need further control of these markets to take the risk out
of them. Remember, when you hear “shadow banking market,” think
capital markets. So when the bank regulators say they want to de-risk
capital markets, just sit back and think to yourself, what are capital
markets for? They are for investors to put capital at risk, whether those
investors are retail, institutional, or whoever, in the hope of seeking a
return. That is America. You want to de-risk that? Do you think you are
going to get the same return in a de-risked banking-like market? I will
tell you, no. Then you ask yourself, what are these markets? You
mentioned mortgage lending. I do not know that statistic, but it does not
127. Ben McLannahan, Shadow Banks Grab Record US Loans Share, FINANCIAL
TIMES, (May 31, 2015, 3:12 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3754ac32-0644-11e589c1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz42vThnNID [http://perma.cc/JJ2J-FKL4].
128. Helmut Kraemer-Eis with Francesco Battazzi, Remi Charrier, Marco Natoli &
Matteo Squilloni, Institutional Non-Bank Lending and the Role of Debt Funds 10 (Euro.
Inv. Fund, Working Paper No. 2014/25, 2014) (“ECB president Mario Draghi
mentioned in an often quoted statement that ‘in the United States 80% of credit
intermediation goes via the capital markets. . . . In the European situation it is the other
way round. 80% of financial intermediation goes through the banking system.’”),
http://www.eif.org/news_centre/publications/eif_wp_25.pdf [http://perma.cc/ZGF9-X2
FN].
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surprise me. If I was J.P. Morgan or Morgan Stanley, I would not want
to be in the market for issuing mortgages after 2008. But, of course, now
you are fine, because you have the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, which regulates mortgages, and if not the institutions directly,
then the practices and the products that are issued, whether you be a
bank or a non-bank. You have a whole new agency within the Fed, if
you can call it an agency, dedicated to ferreting out those abuses. I do
not know what they do in Europe.
But there is this big mindset that we have to de-risk these so-called
shadow banking markets. If you go back and you look at the financial
crisis, just ask, what evidence is there? Where is this big source of
systemic risk in the capital markets? Capital markets, as in our exchange
earlier on the panel, are supposed to be about risking capital, getting a
return, and if things get out of whack, whether it is a failure—a failure
of the product or the failure of a firm, taking your losses. 2008 skewed
all of that. The bail out of Bear Stearns, which was supposed to fail
because they were not a bank and they did not have access to the
taxpayer window, created a moral hazard that played out in Lehman,
AIG, and elsewhere. It created a big mess. So in the “shadow banking”
markets, when you hint, as the government, that maybe you are not
going to fail, then you distort the whole notion of what a capital market
is or what shadow banking markets are. That is what the government
did. They bailed out Bear Stearns and then they could not figure out how
to get off that slippery slope. That is what they are trying to figure out. I
think it is pure folly. We saw it play out in the asset management
industry in a very real way, as they determined whether to designate big
mutual funds as systemically important and regulate them like banks. If
you regulate everything like banks, we will live in France, whether you
like it or not. You might like France, but I do not want to live in France.
Any other questions? Thank you very much for having me.
CAITLIN FAHEY: Thank you all so much for coming today.
Thank you, Commissioner Gallagher. My name is Caitlin Fahey. I am
the Symposium Editor of the Journal of Corporate and Financial Law. I
just want to take a brief moment to say a special thank-you to people
who have been instrumental in putting this event together today.
Commissioner Gallagher, Mr. Kim, Professor Squire, Mr. Grossman,
thank you for dedicating your valuable time and sharing your insight
with us today. Professor Gentile, Professor Griffith, Professor Squire,
thank you for your support and your guidance in organizing today’s
symposium. The Journal is so grateful to have such dedicated faculty.
This event would not have been possible without your help. I would like
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to also thank Carrie Johnson, Julian Phillippi, and Shanelle Holley for
their help coordinating today’s event. I would also like to recognize Max
Dillan and Chris Bonser, who are our Editor-in-Chief and Managing
Editor. Also a special thank-you to the Symposium Committee for doing
such a great job with today’s event. Lastly, I would like to say that on
behalf of the Journal, we want to say a special thank-you to our alumni
who are here today. One of Fordham’s greatest strengths is the alumni’s
longstanding commitment to the school and its students. The Journal is
so grateful that its alumni have come here to support us today. I hope
you will all join us next door for a cocktail reception. You will get a
chance to meet our panelists and keynote speaker. Thank you all again
for coming today.

